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This research effort was designed to examine Army Officers' prefer-
ence for risk in a variety of military decision-making environments. A
questionnaire was developed to elicite an officer's general preference
for risk in three areas of decision; combat, finance, and career settings.
This survey was administered to approximately 300 Army Officers represent-
ing a broad cross-section of the Army population.
It was hypothesized that Army Officers would shift their preference
for risk on the basis of the decision frame they faced and that some sys-
tematic differences between ranks and other distinguishing demographic
variables would be evident. The general results support the conclusion
that Army Officers are more risk aggressive in combat decisions than in
finance decisions. In addition, there is evidence that there is a tend-
ency for senior officers to be relatively more risk aggressive than junior
officers. This indicates that the military promotion and reward system
may have a preference for the risk seeker over the risk averse officer.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION — - - — 11
A. BACKGROUND 11
B. RELEVANT ISSUES - - 14
C. HYPOTHESIS - - 16
D. THESIS METHODOLOGY 18
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 20




III. METHODOLOGY — - - 33
A. SAMPLE SELECTION 33
B. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT - 36
1. Demographics 38
2. Combat Questions 41
3. Financial Questions 44
4. Career Questions 47
C. SURVEY PRETESTS 50
D. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 50
IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS — 53
A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS 54
1. Rank of Respondent 55
2. Education Level of Respondent 56
3. Basic Specialty of Respondent 56
4. Respondents with Combat Experience 57

5. Respondents' Expected Length of Service at
Retirement 58
6. Early Promotion Selection 58
7. Source of Commission 58
B. FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES FOR EACH QUESTION 59
C. SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 60
D. STATISTICAL METHOD — 63
E. ANALYSIS OF COMBAT VARIABLE 64
1
.
Rank of Respondent/Combat 65
2. Sex of Respondent/Combat 66
3. Marital Status/Combat 68
4. Basic Specialty/Combat 69
5. Combat Experience/Combat 70
6. Service Experience/Combat 71
7. Expected Years of Service at Retirement/
Combat 72
8. Early Promotion/Combat 73
9. Command and General Staff College/Combat 74
10. Expected Highest Rank/Combat 75
11. Source of Commission/Combat 76
F. ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL VARIABLE 77
1. Rank of Respondent/Finance 77
2. Education Level/Finance 78
3. Combat Experience/Finance 79
4. Years of Service Experience/Finance 80

5. Age of Respondent/Finance 81
6. Selection for Early Promotion/Finance 82
7. Command and General Staff College/Finance 84
G. ANALYSIS OF THE CAREER VARIABLE 85
1
.
Rank of Respondent/Career 85
2. Combat Experience/Career 86
3. Source of Commission/Career 87
4. Modified Career Decision Frame 88
H. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPOSITE SURVEY — 91
1 Rank of Respondent/Survey 92
2. Sex of Respondent/Survey 92
3. Basic Specialty/Survey 92
4. Age of Respondent/Survey 93
5. Selection for Early Promotion/Survey 93
6. Selection for Command and General Staff
College/Survey 93
I. SPEARMANS CROSS-CORRELATED TEST — 100
V. CONCLUSIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 101
A. CONCLUSIONS — - 101
1. Decision Frame Preference Shift 101
2. Rank Relation to Combat Risk Preference 103
3. Rank Relation to Finance Risk Preference 105
4. Rank Relation to Career Risk Preference 106
5. Risk Preference and Military Success 108
6. Basic Specialty and Risk Preference 110

7. Questionnaire Validation 110
8. Education and Risk Preference 112
B. QUALIFICATIONS - — 113
C. RECOMMENDATIONS - 114
APPENDIX A: DECISION QUESTIONNAIRE - — 116
APPENDIX B: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS — 124
LIST OF REFERENCES - - - - 129




I. Response Table 36
II. Rank of Respondent/Frequency of Response 55
III. Education Level of Respondent/Frequency of
Response 56
IV. Basic Specialty/Frequency of Response 57
V. Grouped Basic Specialty/Frequency of Response 57
VI. Combat Experience/Frequency of Response 58
VII. Expected Retirement/Frequency of Response 58
VIII. Early Promotion/Frequency of Response 58
IX. Commission Source/Frequency of Response —
'
59
X. Survey Questionnaire/Frequency of Response 60
XI. Significance Levels of Statistical Tests 62
XII. Crosstabs Table of Rank vs Combat 66
XIII. Crosstabs Table of Respondents Sex vs Combat 67
XIV. Crosstabs Table of Marital Status vs Combat 68
XV. Crosstabs Table of Grouped Basic Specialty vs
Combat 69
XVI. Crosstabs Table of Combat Experience vs Combat 70
XVII. Crosstabs Table of Years of Service Experience vs
Combat 71
XVIII. Crosstabs Table of Retirement vs Combat 72
XIX. Crosstabs Table of Early Promotion vs Combat 73
XX. Crosstabs Table of C&GSC vs Combat 74



















XXXIX. Summary 01F Spe
ted Highest Rank vs Combat 75
e of Source of Commission vs Combat 76
e of Rank of Respondent vs Finance 78
e of Education Level vs Finance 79
e of Combat Experience vs Finance 80
e of Service Experience vs Finance 81
e of Age vs Finance 82
e of Early Promotion vs Finance 83
e of C&GSC vs Finance 84
e of Respondents' Rank vs Career
e of Combat Experience vs Career
e of Commission Source vs Career
e of Rank vs Survey
e of Respondents' Sex vs Survey -
e of Basic Specialty vs Survey --
e of Age vs Survey
e of Early Promotion vs Survey --















Within the Department of Defense (DOD) military officers are con-
fronted with a wide variety of decisions which require either near term
or long term resolution. The context of these decisions is equally
varied, ranging from administrative decisions routinely experienced in
the civilian business world to combat decisions with wery different
ramifications than those of civilian managers.
Consider the newly commissioned officer serving in Vietnam who was
suddenly confronted with decisions about how to best deploy his platoon
on a search and destroy mission. The choice dilemma for this officer
becomes one of dispersal of troops thereby increasing the potential for
encounter (mission goal) against less dispersion which increases the
safety of his troops. Further consider the Division Commander who is
given limited resources to allocate between competing needs such as
equipment maintenance and operational training. The choice dilemma for
this officer becomes one of trade offs between troop readiness and
equipment readiness.
Because of the possible outcomes resulting from these decisions,
potential loss of life in the case of combat decisions, the military
places a high premium on assessing the effectiveness of an officer's
decision making. In fact, the ability of an officer to make timely,
well-considered and effective decisions is a criterion which is subjec-
tively measured as a part of an officer's performance evaluation. [Ref. 1]
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By far the preponderence of these evaluations have concentrated on the
outcomes or results of an officer's decisions. There is an obvious
propensity for evaluators to rate decision making ability based solely
on the success of the decision. Although the success of a decision is
demonstrably important, a more complete understanding of the operative
decision making process may be useful in assessing an officer's decision
making ability.
Understanding the processes underpinning an officer's decision making
behavior requires an examination of the psychological principles which
govern this process. The generally accepted theory utilized to explain
this process is that people make decisions based on their subjective
calculation of the relevant risks associated with each alternative
considered. In essence, the decision maker calculates the expected value
each alternative will provide, then the rational decision maker selects
the alternative which offers the highest value. The use of this expected
value model has promoted an interest in categorizing decision makers
according to their preference for risk. A risk averse decision can be
thought of as a decision where the certain alternative is preferred to an
alternative which has equal or greater expected value but involves more
uncertainty. For example, the investor who puts his money in a bank at
lower fixed interest rates, rather than a mutual fund at historically
higher rates but with less security than the bank can be viewed as risk
averse. In contrast, a risk aggressive decision is one in which a riskier
alternative is preferred to another alternative which is less risky but
offers equal expected value to the decision maker, such as the investor
12

who invests money in stocks rather than in bonds. The expected value of
each investment option may be the same, but unstable fluctuations in
stocks may dramatically alter the value of this investment either up or
down while the bonds have guaranteed stability.
While significant research has been concentrated on measuring or
identifying risk trends as an independent variable in the decision making
process, little effort has been expended in adapting this research to
the military environment. The very nature of the military profession
requires that the military officer be prepared to confront decisions
involving a great degree of personal and professional risk. It seems
logical to assume that these officers should be psychologically prepared
to accept 'a greater degree of uncertainty and risk in the decisions they
make. Given this need for psychological preparedness, the military
environment may develop or promote attitudes towards risk unique to its
profession. For example the military might reward the officers who are
typically risk aggressive rather than cautious in the decisions they make.
Additionally, the type of decisions confronting officers may alter their
decision process. They may have one type of preference for risk in
combat and another in administrative decisions. This research builds
upon previous decision-making research as a basis to explore risk
preference in the military and determine if these preferences vary





A military officer exists in a risk prone setting. Tremendous
responsibility for the total welfare of other individuals typically rests
on the military officer as well as responsibility for the proper alloca-
tion of limited resources. Despite the ostensible training and multitude
of official regulations designed to strictly guide his activities, the
military officer is frequently confronted with an environment rife with
uncertainty.
The decisions characterized by risk and uncertainty which a military
officer faces can be divided into the three broad but distinct categories
of combat, financial and career. A more explicit discussion of the
similarity between risk and uncertainty in this context is provided in
the Literature Review chapter.
The combat decision is perhaps the most unique and compelling event
for military officers. The combat decision encompasses the essence of
the military decision dilemma. There are the lives of your own sub-
ordinates, the mission, national purpose, the officer's own life, and
frequently the lives of innocent bystanders that must be considered and
kept in perspective. Despite this importance in terms of lives, there
are no prescribed guidelines which quantify all the variables relevant
to the decision. The intangibles such as fear, pride, leadership, and
survival all contribute to confound the military decision maker. This
interaction of conflicting physical, psychological, and moral precepts




Many military financial decisions are also typified by a high degree
of risk. Despite public opinion about military excesses, the individual
military officer has limited resources to satisfy requirements which
generally exceed what is feasible. Given limited resources, ewery decision
involving these resources should be optimized. This optimal level of
execution is necessary not only from a professional desire to accomplish
an assigned mission (organizational effectiveness), but also to a great
extent in response to the extensive scrutiny that resource decisions
receive in the military. Oversight of these decisions is routinely
exercised by a variety of sources including the public, audit agencies,
Inspector Generals, Congressional inquiry, resource sponsors, and other
military organizations competing for resources. Under this intense lime-
light the ramifications of a resource decision viewed as inappropriate
poses great personal and organizational risk for the military decision
maker.
Implicit in any decision officers make (including combat and financial
decisions) is the realization that the outcomes may have a significant
impact on their careers. The military career environment is unique in
its historical application of the "up or out" philosophy. This engenders
a system which requires officers to demonstrate potential beyond their
current level in order to be successful in a career sense. Sustained
excellence only on par with the current level shows limited potential and
will typically end a military officer's career. The dwindling number of
senior officer positions (as reflected in the pyramid rank structure)
creates an atmosphere of intense competition for promotion within the
system. So intense is this competition that a single bad efficiency
15

report (OER) will stigmatize an officer's overall performance to the
extent that he will probably be passed over for promotion. In many
instances an OER could be considered "bad" if it has average or typical
marks in a few key blocks. This "up or out" philosophy taken in the
context of the personal and professional investment which the officer has
established in a military career creates situations where every decision
is potentially career jeopardizing. For a military officer a decision
involves not only the immediate environment of the decision, but also
the attendant risks associated with long range career aspirations.
C. HYPOTHESIS
The central research question is whether military officers demonstrate
consistent preferences for risk in the decisions they make. Do they
change their preference for risk based on the decision context they are
confronted with? For example, officers may be risk aggressive for combat
decisions but risk averse for financial decisions. Alternatively they
may not display any consistent pattern at all within these decision frames.
In the combat decision frame it is plausible that the officer in the
0-1 paygrade will be much more risk averse than the 0-6 officer* and
that there will be some curvilinear relation in between. This belief is
based on the relative inexperience of the 0-1 in combat situations. It
seems reasonable to expect that a junior officer will be faced with a
higher level of uncertainty in a combat situation than a senior officer
*For the purposes of this study, 0-6 and above officers were considered
"successful" from the standpoint of career accomplishment and were assumed
to provide similar responses. Consequently this data was grouped in order
to enlarge the data base of this smaller population.
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will be. The junior officer's mastery of the military skills, his
relative comfort with his personal convictions, as well as his lack of
organizational awareness, will increase the intensity of the apparent
risk as compared to that experienced by the more senior officer.
In the context of financial decisions it is hypothesized that junior
officers will be more aggressive than senior officers. The lack of
experience the junior officers possess in this decision frame may make
them prone to exposing themselves to the risky choice. The reason inex-
perience is expected to cause junior officers to be averse in the combat
decision frame and aggressive in the finance decision frame relative to
more senior officers is because it is expected that the different ranks
will perceive the magnitude of the consequences differently in each of
the decision frames. In the combat decision frame, the threat of life
loss is expected to weigh more heavily in the final decision of the
junior officers as compared to the mission which is expected to be most
prominent in the minds of the more senior officers. In the finance
decision frame the career consequences and awareness of scrutiny is
expected to influence the decision of the more senior officers towards
the risk averse alternative more often than less experienced officers.
In other words, as the officer becomes more senior, it seems plausible
that a more conservative course of action would be followed, due in part
to the awareness of scrutiny and the severe consequences of improper
decisions within the financial decision frame.
Within the career setting it is hypothesized that the junior officer
is typically risk aggressive. This is expected because they are generally
unaware of the relationship between the decisions they make and their
17

career. At this point it is unlikely they have even formulated a concrete
understanding of what a career is in the military sense. Their focus is
predominantly short range or immediate considerations. In contrast, it
is expected that midrange officers (0-3, 0-4) would be more risk averse
than the junior officers. These officers have synthesized their personal
and professional needs to the point that they have decided on the military
as a career. They would therefore tend to be cautious in the decisions
that may impact adversely on their career expectations. It is believed
that more senior officers will exhibit a more risk aggressive profile.
In a sense they have attained their "career" so they may be inured to
the sense of risk as it relates to career decisions.
D. THESIS METHODOLOGY
In order to adequately address the hypothesis postulated, as well as
the central research question, the thesis is organized into functional
chapters consisting of Literature Review, Methodology, Results, and Con-
clusions, Qualifications, and Recommendations.
The Literature Review chapter provides a synthesis of important
theories and concepts, as well as previous research which is essential to
understanding or appreciating the complexities and interactions of risk
in decision theory. The primary focus of this review is on research
efforts and studies which examined changing risk preferences and the
variables which may be related to these changes. These references provide
the basis for the development of our decision questionnaire which is
designed to measure risk preferences in a military setting.
18

The best method for acquiring the data necessary to determine the
validity of the central research question and hypothesis was determined to
be the administration of a questionnaire. As elaborated in the Methodology
chapter, unique military questions were developed and the general approach
was to survey a broad cross section of Army Officers to obtain an indica-
tion of their preferences for risk within the specified decision frames.
These preferences were then analyzed by a variety of statistical techniques
to generate results, conclusions, and implications.
The overriding concern of the Results chapter was to provide a simple
straight forward presentation of the significant results obtained during
the research. This includes a more in depth discussion of the particular
statistical methods used as well as the significance of the noted results.
The Conclusions chapter addresses the specific research hypothesis
and research questions in terms of the results found in the research. In
addition, the implications of these results for the military in general
and the Army in particular are provided. An effort is made to draw
together the results of this research with previous research efforts.
Finally in this chapter, the limitations of the general research methods,
the results reached, and general recommendations for follow-on research





Inherent in any review of the literature applicable to this research
project is an appreciation that consideration should be afforded to pro-
viding an acceptable definition of risk as well as the more extensively
studied process of decision making. The only universally accepted
definition of "risk" is found in the dictionary. This simplistic but
intuitively appealing definition essentially says that risk is a chance
of encountering hazard or peril, or the exposure to such a chance. [Ref. 2]
Risk is a concept which is frequently referred to in normal everyday social
interchange and is included in research concerning decision making. Risk
is a part of living and is present to a greater or lesser degree in every-
thing we do or may contemplate doing in today's world. "Most accidents
happen within 25 miles of home . . . ", "Slow down . . .", "Be careful
crossing the street ..." are all examples of how risk is addressed
indirectly in everyday life. The implication being that failure to heed
the warning will increase the personal risk towards some accident in these
examples.
These transparent examples are intuitively obvious and probably serve
as the basis for the common dictionary level understanding of the concept
of risk. However, this explanation of risk has proven to be inadequate in
its application in decision theory. A significantly more robust and
esoteric understanding of risk was provided by Bugental's reflection "I am
saying that each man lives his life in the midst of a contingency ... I
20

do not know, I cannot know enough to be safe, to be secure, to predict
with complete confidence from one moment to the next . . . anxiety is
my recognition that I do not know all that I need to know to protect
that which I love and forestall that which I fear." [Ref. 3]
At an even higher order of conceptualization, Hampden-Turner in 1970
developed a theory of psychological development in which risk was an
integral part. He felt that in order for an individual to grow intellec-
tually as well as socially he must "open" himself to different risks.
By doing so, the individual may risk personal or intellectual criticism
in order to gain a more developed sense of personal worth. One can not
reach this level without temporarily surrendering and risking permanent
loss. In this view, Hampden-Turner characterized the creative person as
being a bigger risk-taker and based this on research showing higher
levels of adolescent self-esteem related to greater risk-taking. [Ref. 5]
The most extensive review of the subject of risk is found in the
unpublished doctoral thesis "Phenomenology of Risk" by Dr. Gib Akin.
This work is an attempt to develop a more complete meaning of risk as a
human phenomenon by providing an experiential referrent to supplement
our practical as well as psychological understanding of risk. This is an
experiential understanding, where risk is presented as a fundamental
structure of human accomplishment, as a particular method for engaging
the daily events one confronts. [Ref. 4]
A more pragmatic definition of risk was developed by Frank Knight.
He believed that the key to understanding risk was related to man's
inability to predict the future and imperfections or limitations in man's
knowledge. He characterized risk taking as action in the face of
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uncertainty. He suggested that we establish probabilities because of
our inability to measure with certainty all of the relevant conditions
confronting us. Therefore decisions involving risk are characterized by
probabilistic outcomes so one makes a subjective probability judgment and
an estimate of how good that judgment is in calculating the action they will
take. In this sense probabilities are assigned to each alternative and then
one forms a confidence interval around each probability. For example, the
football player handicapper may make one team the favorite, but he may only
be 60% confident in his selection.
Knight also developed a model for measuring risk-taking that has been
adopted by other researchers. His paradigm equated risk and uncertainty
where "uncertainty can be treated as cases of choice between smaller reward
more confidently and a larger reward less confidently anticipated." [Ref. 7]
The relationship between risk and uncertainty is prevalent throughout
the literature where uncertainty is usually referred to as the context of
the amount of information available about the consequences or outcomes of
the alternatives. In this vein, decision situations are often distinguished
on the basis of the amount of uncertainty inherent in each alternative.
For example, if for each alternative considered the related outcome is
precisely known, the situation is one of decision under conditions of
certainty. If the relative likelihood (probability) of any outcomes that
may occur is known, the situation may be described as one of objective
risk. If only possible outcomes are known and their relative probabili-
ties are unknown, the case is one of uncertainty. While the classifica-
tion of the objective risk situation is intuitively appealing, it seems
equally consistent to classify situations of uncertainty as a decision
22

involving subjective risk. This connection between uncertainty and sub-
jective risk is made because it is felt that the decision maker faced
with an uncertain situation will make a subjective evaluation, often sub-
consciously, of the likelihood associated with each alternative. [Ref. 6]
Richmond [Ref. 8] also suggested that managers are confronted with
several types of decision situations, differentiated by the extent and
kind of information available. He characterized one of these situations
as decision making under risk. This is typified when the manager,
although he is not certain what will happen as a result of his decision,
is still able to assign subjective probabilities to the possible outcomes.
The usual process for determining the appropriateness of an alternative is
to determine its subjective expected value or utility. This is accom-
plished by multiplying the subjective probability that the outcome will
occur by its expected value or utility. In this context, a utility is a
number that represents the level of satisfaction that an individual receives
from a particular choice. The rational decision maker will try to optimize
his decision by choosing the alternative with the highest value. This
process or mode is usually referred to in the literature as calculating
the expected value or utility theory. For example, suppose a person
entered a contest and was given the choice between two alternatives. One
alternative offers a 70% chance of attaining a $100 prize, and the other
alternative offers a 30% chance of winning a $200 prize. Under this model,
the rational decision maker would choose the first alternative as it yields




The expected utility model is the most widely used and recognized
theory which describes the manner in which most decisions under situations
characterized by uncertainty are made. This model has face validity for
many decision makers since it is rational and easy to understand. In
support of this, Patten et al
. ,
[Ref. 14] have shown that the use of
utility theory to measure risk taking attitudes is feasible and concluded
that these attitudes were not situation or scenario dependent. Their
study, relying on a battery of tests, combining personality, utility and
risk-taking measures, supported their findings.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the expected utility model has been
widely criticized as simplistic and not germane to various situational
and psychological variables. In essence it essentially relies on the
manager "playing the odds." Koontz and O'Donnell [Ref. 9] pointed out
that managers do not rely exclusively on a calculation of the odds since
"most managers understandably influenced by the dangers of failure, tend
to be, to some extent, risk averters and do not, in fact, play the averages
so statistical probabilities are not good enough for practical decision
making." [Ref. 9]
Hogarth was critical of the expected utility model's treatment of
uncertainty and the decision makers' ability to assign the necessary sub-
jective probabilities required for the calculation of the expected utility.
He concluded that "man is a stepwise information processing system with
limited capacity, and is ill-equipped for assessing subjective probability
distributions. Furthermore, man just ignores uncertainty. The psycholog-
ical reduction of uncertainty is in itself a useful cognitive simplifica-
tion mechanism. The notion that events are uncertain is both uncomfortable
24

and complicating. Indeed, even in the supposedly rational world of
business, there is evidence that businessmen are averse to admitting
uncertainty." [Ref. 15]
One of the most straight forward and useful explanations on the subject
was developed by Tversky and Kahneman in their article on "Judgement and
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases". In this article they attempt to
look at how people evaluate uncertainty and what actions people take to
reduce or avoid uncertainty which they feel is a property of the environ-
ment rather than within themselves. They found that people rely on a
limited number of heuristic principles such as anchoring, representative-
ness and availability to reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabili-
ties and assigning values to simple judgmental operations. While useful
in reducing uncertainty or risk, these heuristics routinely bias the
judgmental process and can cause severe and systematic errors. [Ref. 16]
Another important study by Slovic [Ref. 13] showed that research
subjects when confronted with choices of equal utility resolved this
dilemma by selecting the alternative which was superior on the more
important dimension. Basically the decisions were made on aspects which
were easy to justify, while vague or more complicated aspects were
neglected. This study supports Tversky' s work on elimination by aspect.
Grether and Plot [Ref. 12] found preference reversals in decisions
were made under conditions which were controlled for psychological and
economic variables; this was contrary to the traditional utility theory.
They believed these reversals could best be explained by the specific
context or changes in context in which the decision was made. For example,
the mode of response or the phrasing of the question influenced the choice.
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Expanding on their earlier work, Kahneman and Tversky [Ref. 11]
presented a critique of expected utility theory which emphasized several
inconsistencies in the use of this model of decision making under risk.
They found that people tended to undervalue outcomes which were only
probable in comparison with outcomes obtained with certainty. For example,
they conducted a number of studies where subjects were asked to choose
between two alternatives with different expected values. In one instance
the choice was between an 80% chance of $4000 or a certain $3000. Despite
the higher expected value of the first alternative, i.e., $3200, 8 out of
10 respondents were risk averse in selecting the certain outcome of $3000.
If instead the signs of the outcomes are reversed so that gains are
replaced by losses, in the example just provided, 92 out of 100 respondents
selected the risk aggressive choice of an 80% chance of losing $4000.
Kahneman and Tversky called this the "certainty effect" and felt it contrib-
utes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and risk aggressive-
ness in decisions involving sure losses. In addition, closely related to
the certainty effect, Kahneman and Tversky presented some alternative
explanations of decision behavior which varied from the traditional expected
value theory. These included the reflection effect, and the isolation
effect, all of which contribute to inconsistent preferences when the same
choice is presented in different forms.
A significant portion of Kahneman and Tversky 's research dealt with the
manner in which subjects alter their preferences based on the way a deci-
sion is framed. A simple but graphical example involves the manner in which
the costs associated with credit card purchases are presented to consumers.
Consumers are more willing to forego a cash discount and use a credit card
26

if the charge is included in the price than if the consumer is offered
a cash rate with a credit-card surcharge. Studies have shown that the
different labels induce different reference points resulting in the
preference reversal. Kahneman and Tversky labeled this phenomenon as
reversals due to differing framing of outcomes.
Another example of preference reversals was linked to different
framing of the contingencies associated with a decision. In the case of
property insurance, studies have shown that consumers alter their prefer-
ence for various types of insurance policies based on the manner in which
certain aspects of the policies are framed. People would be more apt to
purchase a $100 insurance policy characterized as providing full property
protection against fire than a policy of the same price which is charac-
terized as limited property protection since it has no protection against
flood but still has full coverage against fire. In this case both policies
offer the same level of protection, but the first policy is framed in a
more appealing manner by highlighting the fire protection aspect.
As a result of their findings involving the certainty effect, the
isolation effect, and preference reversals due to decision frames,
Kahneman and Tversky developed an alternative theory of choice in which
value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in
which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. They labeled their
model as the "prospect theory" and felt it best explained several of the
types of preference reversals which systematically violate the axioms of




A major emphasis in the empirical study of risk has been to find the
determinates of risk-taking behavior or more precisely what variables
impact on this behavior. To this end a significant number of experimental
studies have been conducted by changing a number of variables hypothesized
to be relevant and then noting any change in risk-taking behavior.
Prominent among these studies is the work done by Kogan and Wallach [Ref. 17],
the basis of their effort being relevant moderating variables. They seemed
most interested in cognition and personality variables and studied risk
taking to learn about the "psychology of thinking in its broad outlines."
In order to determine which variables were relevant, Kogan and Wallach
developed a choice dilemma instrument designed to measure levels of risk-
taking. In this instrument seven procedures or situations were described
and the subject was then asked to advise a fictional person facing a
dilemma. For example, one question poses the dilemma of Mr. A, an engineer
who has a secure job at a modest but adequate salary. He has however,
been offered a job with a newly formed company with no established future.
The new job would pay more to start and offer several additional incen-
tives if the company prospered. The subject is then asked to report the
lowest probability of success that he would consider acceptable to make it
worthwhile for Mr. A to take the job. [Ref. 4]
In general terms, Kogan and Wallach conclude that there are two
sources which explain the tendency towards risk or conservatism in the
decision-making sphere, motivation and cognition. Given these sources,
their questionnaire demonstrated general and consistent personal procliv-
ities for risk taking.
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Kogan and Wallach's initial work spurred numerous other studies, one
of which was Stoner's work on the risky-shift. He discovered that after
group discussions of a number of problems, the group consensus decisions
tended to be more risky than the individual decisions were prior to group
discussions. He then coined this as the risky-shift caused by the group
process. A large amount of research was produced concerning the process
and determinates of the risky-shift, but many conflicting results have
been published. Most of the current efforts have ignored the notion that
groups take more risks than individuals and have concentrated on analyzing
the mechanisms at work in group discussions. [Ref. 18]
In 1962, Slovic attempted to measure risk-taking tendencies by corre-
lating nine variables such as response sets, job preference, gambling
preference, life experience and peer ratings of subjects. The correlation
among Slovic 's risk-taking measures were generally not significant, indi-
cating a lack of convergent validity. [Ref. 19] Slovic explained the lack
of consistency among the separate measures by contending that "risk is a
multidimensional concept and most of the presumably 'risk relevant 1 measures
have been tapping these dimensions differently." [Ref. 27] He felt that
"willingness to take risks may not be a general trait at all but rather one
which varies from situation to situation within each individual." [Ref. 27]
One of the variables Slovic studied was a response set which measures
a general tendency to respond in a predicted manner, no matter what the
stimulus condition or situation. For example, Slovic used a questionnaire
to which individuals could answer either quickly or accurately based on




In studying the application of risk-taking in decision making, the most
common technique for measuring risk preferences typically involves the use
of a gambling scenario. In these studies, gambles using either real or
imaginary bets have been conducted by Slovic, Fischhoff, Tversky, Kahneman,
and Lichtenstein which relate to this research effort.
Studies designed to measure peer ratings usually involve having people
assess whether subjects who are familiar to them are risk-takers or not.
Some research has been done (Dyer and Stern 1957) using a self-assessment
technique where people were required to state whether they perceived them-
selves to be risk takers. This self-reporting has tended to produce
biased results in that "on the average, individuals view themselves as
riskier than their peers." [Ref. 21]
Johnsgard and Ogilvie have conducted research related to the personality
traits of high risk sportsmen. They administered personality tests and
developed a profile which showed "The data thus far lends no support to the
notion that he is bent on self-destruction. He is not particularly guilt-
prone and externalizes his aggressiveness to a greater extent than others.
He is not a neurotic individual." [Ref. 23]
Rosenthal [Ref. 24] studied the physiological aspect of people who
engaged in risk-oriented activities. He found that people who engage in
sports known as risky (polo, skiing, mountain climbing, racing, etc.)
experienced a high degree of exhilaration and the feeling of well -being
shortly after the activity in contrast to non-risky sports. He felt that
there was a positive correlation between longer, healthier life and
involvement in risky activities, and that people were more creative and
productive after involvement with a risky activity.
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Finally Klausner [Ref. 25] studied two variables, fear and enthusiasm
in parachutists. They developed a dynamic model in which a buildup of
fear is converted to enthusiasm. This change occurs when the jumper
passes the point of no voluntary return. The person willingly puts him-
self in the risky situation and then resigns himself to fate, with the
conversion being the most important process. He found that "the greater
degree of fear which the person can generate in himself, the greater the
enthusiasm he will experience; thus there is a motivation for seeking
danger."
Other prominent variables which have been studied for their relation-
ship to risk-taking include age and sex. Kogan and Wallach [Ref. 17]
found that risk aversion varied directly with age, but apparently does
not systematically vary with sex. However, Slovic [Ref. 26] studied
risk-taking in children and found a sex difference in risk-taking along
the norm of our cultural stereotype: boys were bolder than girls.
Despite the wide scope and number of risk-taking studies conducted in
the civilian community there have been few studies conducted using mili-
tary subjects. Perhaps the most significant study involving military
personnel was an unpublished thesis done at the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College which applied Kogan and Wallach's choice dilemma
questionnaire in a military environment. The general purpose of this
thesis was to see if military officers were more risk aggressive than
civilians. The principle findings were inconclusive as younger officers
were more risk aggressive than civilians but older officers were more
risk averse. In addition to these results, several important features
relating to military officers were reported. In particular, significant
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variances in risk preference were noted for several demographic features
such as age, marital status and source of commission.
Perhaps the most salient point of the research reviewed is that there
is no single unifying concept or theory of risk in decision-making which
induces a measure of consensus, nor is it felt that there must be. The
amorphous nature of the psychological processes involved and understand-
able limitations on the ability to interpret these processes, make this a
difficult if not impossible proposition. It is not intended to solve
this dilemma with this research effort. It is also not intended to
propose a unifying theory nor even to develop a new theory on risk in
decision making. Rather, it is hoped to apply this rich and varied body
of existing studies to the military environment with this research effort.
For example, many of the variables included in Slovic's studies, such as
job preference and experience, as well as some of the psychological
motivations alluded to will be used to analyze and critique the relevance
of the results obtained in this research effort. If risk in decision-
making is prevalent in our everyday life, it is a component of the military
officer's existence in a unique and meaningful way. It is hoped to
critique the previous research efforts by reviewing how risk in decision-
making interacts with military officers. With this effort it is expected




This chapter provides an overview of the specific research techniques
used to collect and empirically analyze data relevant to the central
research question and hypothesis. The chapter is broken down into five
major sections which range from the Sample Selection procedures used to
identify the target population, through Analytical Techniques relied on
to evaluate the data collected.
A. SAMPLE SELECTION
In order to test the beliefs discussed in the hypothesis, the study
population had to be determined and a representative sample selected. It
was decided that the general discussion of risk behavior in military
officers would be limited in application to army officers. This self-
imposed restriction was placed in order to have a more manageable popula-
tion with potentially more meaningful results.
It was important that the sample represent a significant variety of
career and job positions to ensure that a mix of combat, combat support,
and service support officers would be included. A convenient data base
with a representative cross-section of army officers was available through
the Fort Ord California personnel office. This data base, in the form of
a computer printout which could be utilized as a mailing list, contained
over 2000 officers located from Los Angeles to San Francisco, California,
and included some basic demographic information.
While the computer listing was considered reasonably representative,
one concern was to ensure that a sufficient spread in paygrade (0-1 to 0-6
33

and above) would be included. In particular, we thought that the paucity
of 0-6 and above officers included in the computer run could bias con-
clusions drawn from their sample. A heuristic of a minimum of 20
responses per paygrade was established to alleviate this concern, and a
purposive sample of the 0-6 and above group was drawn from the Washington,
D.C., area to augment the original sample. Additionally, a purposive
sample of finance officers was obtained from Fort Benjamin Harrison to
supplement the listing in order to analyze financial officer responses
to the finance questions.
It was recognized that our survey base was predominantly from the
geographical area of California, but the convenience and access this
population afforded was an overriding concern. Further, the rotation
practice of the Army is such that it is assumed that the California officer
does not significantly vary from the larger army officer population of
which he is a member. Additionally, this survey was largely administered
to what is considered a typical army post (Fort Ord) with a mix of line
and support functions. Therefore, it was our assumption that there would
be no invalidating geographical bias.
The selection process was governed by a desire to achieve a sample
size which was generally representative of the army officer population.
For sampling purposes, the aggregate army officer population was rounded
to 80,000. The desire was to produce a sample response consisting of
0.3%, or 240 officers. Recognizing the pyramid rank structure which
exists in the Army, it was assumed that a dominance of the sample would
reflect the 0-1 to 0-4 paygrades. Further tailoring of the desired sample
was conditioned by the heuristic of needing at least 20 responses in
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any pertinent demographic variables to be measured, specifically the 0-6
and above and finance officers.
The majority of the sample was obtained through direct mail to officers
selected from the Fort Ord computer printout. In addition, questionnaires
were mailed to the Finance School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and others
were personally delivered to Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA),
Washington, D.C.
Since the survey was mailed and no direct administration or instructions
could be given to the recipients, a cover letter was provided. The purpose
of the transmittal letter was to provide an explanation to the recipient as
to the purpose of the questionnaire and instructions for its completion.
As in the construction of the questionnaire itself, specific attempts were
made to avoid the potential for biasing responses. The explanation of the
questionnaire was limited to a discussion of decision-making without specif-
ically addressing the risk aspect because of the potential for biasing.
Additionally, the respondents were assured of their anonymity and informed
that there were no right or wrong answers. The questionnaire transmittal
letter is provided in Appendix A.
It was desired to achieve a selection process from the computer print-
out that would approximate randomness while limiting those selected to a
total number. Based on the specific population in each paygrade contained
in the computer printout, the specific mailing desired from the list was
100 questionnaires each to the 0-1, 0-2, and 0-3 paygrades, 80 surveys
each to the 0-4 and 0-5 paygrades, and 40 to the 0-6 paygrade. Once these
figures were arrived at, the exact selection procedure for any paygrade
was quota sampling which typically consisted of selecting every third
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officer listed. While not precisely random, this approach approximates
randomness and provided a sample which was generally representative of
the mix of officers in the army.
In general, it was expected that the average return rate would be 50%.
However, it was determined that even if this rate were not achieved, that
a much more conservative return rate of 30% would still provide enough data
for meaningful evaluation. The actual responses exceeded the expected
return rate and the total sample consisted of 297 responses as depicted
in the following table:
TABLE I
Response Table
Distribution Technique Fielded Returned Percent
Fort Ord Mail 470 282 60%
Pentagon Personal Delivery 25 15 60%
Fort Ben Harrison Mail 40
Totals 535 297 56%
The 40 surveys mailed to Ft. Benjamin Harrison finance school did not
produce a single response as of the cutoff time for this study. Attempts
to follow-up on this lack of response from the finance school indicated
that approximately 25 responses were returned, but apparently delayed by
the mail system. The response rate to any single question may not equal
the 297 responses possible since some of the questionnaires had some
individual question responses omitted. A more detailed breakdown of the
sample characteristics is available in the Results chapter.
B. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
After reviewing the existing risk preference questionnaires, it was
decided that none would totally satisfy the specific research interests of
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this study. The prime deficiency was viewed as a lack of situational
authenticity when used in the military environment. This deficiency
obviously exists due to the different objectives of the questionnaires.
It was felt that an assessment of a military officer's preference for risk
in a gambling situation would not easily translate into meaningful infer-
ences about the officer's preference for risk in a job related setting.
This belief is substantiated by earlier research which demonstrated that
an individual's preference for risk may be situationally determined [Ref. 13]
As a result, it was necessary to develop a new questionnaire which
incorporated the situational constraints germane to this research effort.
This instrument incorporated some of the features contained in the Tversky
and Kahneman questionnaire [Ref. 10] as well as Kogan and Wallach's choice
dilemma questionnaire [Ref. 17]. It was believed that using these existing
questionnaires as a model would enhance the validity as well as assist in
the preparation of the instrument. Another consideration was to include
questions which would be meaningful across the broad scale of paygrades
(0-1 to 0-8) which comprised the sample. As such, the situations included
some decisions which were normally the province of junior officers, some
the province of midgrade officers, and still others the province of senior
officers. In all cases, attempts were made to provide situations general
enough for the respondent to have some appreciation for the setting of the
decision.
The specific parameters of the survey can be grouped into four major





The first section of demographics included sixteen questions con-
cerning variables of interest to this research effort. These included:
a. Rank
This variable was considered important since rank is a strong
indice of success in the military. Additionally, the basic hypothesis
that military officers may vary their preference for risk based on their
rank could be analyzed with the inclusion of this variable.
b. Sex
This variable was of interest to determine if any significant
variance existed between male and female officers' preference for risk on
the questions.
c. Marital Status
This variable was of interest to determine if bachelor officers
were more or less risk aggressive than married officers who may perceive
greater loss associated with choosing riskier alternatives.
d. Education Level
Subjects were asked to indicate their highest education level
completed. Although not directly related to our central hypothesis, this
variable was included because of potential interest in explaining variances
in results.
e. Basic Specialty
Subjects were asked to provide their basic military specialty
by indicating this in the available space. It was expected that some of
the variance in risk preference demonstrated in the decision frames would




Subjects were asked to indicate if they had ever served in a
combat zone. It was felt that this may be a significant variable in
analyzing the risk preference in combat situations.
g. Years of Active Duty Service
Subjects were asked to indicate their accumulated years of
active duty service. This variable was included to see if military expe-
rience was a factor in an officer's preference for risk,
h. Career Intentions
Subjects were asked to indicate the number of years of service
they planned to have when they retire. This variable was included to
determine if respondents who intended to make the military a career differed
in their preference for risk from officers who planned to get out of the
service at an earlier point,
i. Current Age
Subjects were asked to indicate their age in years. Similar
to rank and years of service, this variable was included to see if age was
correlated with an officer's preference for risk,
j. Early Promotion
Subjects were asked to indicate whether they had ever been
selected for early promotion. This was a key indicator of a successful
decision maker. Officers who have been selected early have been identified
by the promotion system as having been clearly outstanding and in the top
5% of their peers. It is commonly recognized that secondary zone promotion
is probably more indicative of greater potential for career success than
any other attribute an officer may have in his record. This is a key
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variable in looking for potential differences in the manner in which
military officers handle risk in decision making.
k. Advanced Military Schooling
In these two separate questions, subjects were asked to
indicate whether they had ever been selected to attend the Command and
General Staff College (C&GSC)or any of the War Colleges. Both of these
institutions are considered vital "tickets" in a successful military
officer's career. Attendance at the C&GSC is generally accepted as neces-
sary if an officer wants to make 0-5. Selection for the War College is
seen as a clear indicator that an officer has potential for the 0-6 and
above paygrades. Similar to early promotion, these variables will be
measured as success criterion in comparing an officer's preference for
risk.
1. Actual Officer Efficiency Reports (OER)
Respondents were asked to indicate how they would characterize
their OER scores as compared to their peers by indicating either the top
third, middle third, or lower third. This variable was also included as
a measure of success. Clearly those officers who characterized their
OER's as other than the top third would have difficulty achieving 0-6 and
above.
m. Performance
The subjects were asked to indicate how they felt their actual
performance compared to their peers' performance by marking top third,
middle third, or lower third. This variable was included to contrast with
an officer's actual OER beliefs. It was felt that certain officers may
be institutionally successful as indicated by high OER's, but characterize
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their own performance as significantly different. Additionally, actual
performance rather than OER scores may be a more significant measure of
potential success.
n. Commission Source
Respondents were asked to indicate their source of commission
by marking either Academy, ROTC, or other. This variable was included to
determine if any significant differences among the four sources of officers
and their preferences for risk would be evident.
2. Combat Questions
The second major section of the survey is the five questions
constituting the combat decision frame. These questions were designed to
measure an officer's preference for risk by confronting the respondent
with a combat situation followed by two choices. One choice was determined
to be risk aggressive with the other choice characterized as being risk
averse. It was decided to use a series of five questions for a variety of
reasons. Since this instrument had never been utilized before, it was
felt that a mix of questions within each decision frame would provide more
valid results than a single question. This would hopefully enable the
assessment of the degree and consistency of risk aggression producing a
risk profile. This variety of combat questions was also attractive in
that it allowed a much richer combination of situations which could be
depicted by the questions. The ability of the military officer to identify
with and have some empathy for the situations provided by this instrument
was a key concern in the survey design. For each question, the determina-
tion of the relative risk associated with the respective alternatives was
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supported by the pretest and posttest comments and interviews. A brief
discussion of each combat question follows:
a. Combat Question 1
In question one, the situation depicted a Company Commander
expecting an enemy attack likely to kill 100 of his men. The subjects were
then provided two alternatives with equal expected values. Alternative (A)
will ensure that 25 out of the expected 100 will be saved. In contrast,
alternative (B) suggests a 25% chance that all 100 will be saved, but a
3/4 probability that none of the 100 will be saved.
In this situation the expected values are equal and the choice
is between the sure bet of saving 25, thereby losing 75 men, or the riskier
alternative of possibly saving everyone (25% chance) with a high probability
of not saving anyone (75% chance).
b. Combat Question 2
In question two, the situation involved a Company Commander
tasked with achieving an objective held by an inferior enemy force. The
subject is afforded two plans of equal expected value to accomplish the
mission. Plan (A) will accomplish the mission, but would result in the
loss of 5 men. Plan (B) would also accomplish the mission but has a 50%
chance of losing 10 men if detected early but no losses if undetected.
In this situation the expected values are also the same. The dilemma
is between the sure loss of only 5 men offered in (A) or the possibility
of no losses with the potential for the loss of 10 men in (B). The design




c. Combat Question 3
In question three, the situation from question two is altered
by the information that the enemy forces had been underestimated. As a
result, the plan (A) will now yield 140 casualties and plan (B) will
either yield 280 casualties (50% chance) or no losses. Each plan has the
same expected value, therefore the choice dilemma is essentially the same
as in question two. However, the scale of the losses in question three is
significantly greater than in two in order to determine if the magnitude
of the potential losses would alter the decision. The design hypothesis
called for plan (A) to be risk averse and plan (B) to be risk aggressive.
d. Combat Question 4
In question four, the situation portrayed a Division Commander
with 9000 soldiers faced with selecting an attack scenario. The staff has
provided two alternatives of equal expected value. In alternative (A), all
the resources are committed with no reserves. There is a high probability
of success (90%), but failure has a high premium as 6000 soldiers are lost.
In alternative (B), a significant portion of the forces are held in reserve
to react to unanticipated developments. This plan has a 60% chance of
success with failure resulting in the loss of 1500 soldiers. The choice
dilemma is whether to opt for the sure loss of only 1500 soldiers using
the accepted convention of maintaining a reserve force or choose plan (A)
which increases the chance of success but includes the potential disastrous
loss of 6000 soldiers. The design hypothesis characterized plan (B) as
risk averse and plan (A) as risk aggressive.
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e. Combat Question 5
Question five of the combat questions asks the responding
officer to imagine himself as a Company Commander pinned down by enemy
fire. The two alternatives, one being a conventional attack and the
other being to call in an air strike on essentially his own position, have
the same expected value of losses.
The conventional attack results in a sure loss of 40 lives
and the air strike has a 40% chance of 100 lives being lost; the airstrike
is therefore the more risk aggressive between the two choices since the
outcome is uncertain.
3. Financial Questions
The third segment of the survey is comprised of five questions
depicting situations where a military officer is confronted with decisions
characterized by financial considerations. Again the variety of questions
was included to reduce the chance bias that may result from a single ques-
tion and also assist in assessing the degree and consistency of the risk
preference of the respondents. A further concern was to identify finan-
cial questions which would be meaningful to the typical military manager
who has limited precise knowledge of finance but necessarily makes
important decisions on the allocation of scarce resources. A brief
discussion of the five financial questions follows:
a. Finance Question 1
Question six, the first of the financial questions, places the
respondent in the position of envisioning himself as a budget officer for
a military post. As such he is given the choice between forwarding a
budget intact, or inflating the budget estimates to hedge against
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potential cuts. The situation describes the inflated budget as less
believable than the non-inflated estimate. As a result, the respondent
is categorized as risk aggressive if he chooses the inflated budget since
the non-inflated budget is easier to defend.
b. Finance Question 2
The seventh question of the survey situates the respondent as
a transportation officer with an excess deadline inventory which he is
receiving "heat" about. Deadline inventory refers to vehicles which cannot
be used because they are awaiting some form of maintenance or parts. The
options provided are to either use the supply system, which would take a
considerable length of time, or to "cannibalize" some of the deadlined
vehicles to fix others, which "is expected to result in a higher break-
down rate which will cost more in the long run." Since the second option
will cost more, and because of the negative connotation normally associ-
ated with "cannibalizing", it is considered the more risk aggressive
option.
c. Finance Question 3
Question eight of the survey places the respondent in the
position of needing to dispose of a $250,000 contingency fund out of a
$5 million budget. The choices presented the respondent are to turn the
money back in, which results in a 10% reduction in next year's budget, or
to spend the money on a questionable expense. If the 20% chance of
detecting the expenditure were to come to fruition, the respondent is told
that his budget would be reduced by $125,000 for the next year. Similar
to the combat questions, taking the sure loss over the chance of a loss is
considered the more risk averse approach.
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d. Finance Question 4
Question nine* asks the respondent to envision himself as a
Financial Officer forced to make a decision of whether or not to reduce
an existing, but here-to-fore largely unused, contingency fund. In the
question it is stated that "policy guidelines recommend a 6% contingency
fund against unforeseen developments," but it also states later that unused
contingency funds can never be spent efficiently. Four alternatives were
provided in addition to the alternative of maintaining the current contin-
gency fund level. These five choices were provided because pretest showed
some willingness to deviate from policy, however the degree to which
respondents were willing to deviate varied significantly. For the purpose
of measuring risk preference, it was determined that any of the four alter-
natives that reduce the contingency below the policy guidelines would be
considered risk aggressive.
e. Finance Question 5
In question ten, the last of the financial questions, the
respondent is asked to choose an expenditure plan as the Financial Officer
for a post. Three choices are provided; obligate the bulk of the budget
early in the relevant period, obligate the budget funds consistently
throughout the relevant period, or obligate the bulk of the budget funds
late in the period. Since no further discussion is provided concerning
the relative pros and cons of each expenditure plan, it is assumed that a
respondent would select an alternative based on his preference for risk.
The alternative of obligating early in the period carries a more risk





The last segment included in the survey can be best described as
questions concerned with an officer's career. In these five questions, a
number of situations are described which subject the respondent to a
choice dilemma. The alternatives provided can be identified as either
directly career enhancing or personally attractive. It was determined
that the officer who would select the personally attractive choice over
the career attractive choice was more risk aggressive in the career sense,
Again, while the dependent variable "career" was evident in all five
situations, each question varied in its context. A brief discussion of
each of the five career questions follows:
a. Career Question 1
Question eleven of the survey depicts a situation where an
officer is discussing placement possibilities with an assignment officer.
There are two choices offered by the assignment officer with contrasting
characteristics. Assignment choice (A) is characterized as "career
enhancing" and professionally demanding, but is not personally appealing.
Assignment choice (B) is personally appealing but is not considered as
professionally demanding as choice (A).
The assessment of risk associated with each choice was based
on the assumption that the more professionally demanding the job, the
better it will reflect on an officer's career. Using this criterion, the




b. Career Question 2
Question twelve depicts a situation where a junior officer
(0-3) has made a recommendation on an important issue to his boss (an 0-5)
The boss disagrees with the recommendation and despite further discussion
is going to forward his conclusions up the chain withholding the junior
officer's recommendations. The junior officer is faced with two choices:
alternative (A) is for the officer to say nothing more, and it is implied
that his boss will give him a positive OER. Alternative (B) suggests the
junior officer find a way to get the information around the boss. There
is a 50/50 chance this might embarrass the boss and thereby negatively
impact on his OER. The assignment of risk to these alternatives is based
on the assumption that circumventing your boss is a risky proposition and
the chance that it will impact negatively on your OER is putting your
career in risk. Therefore, the design hypothesis assessed alternative (A)
as risk averse and alternative (B) as risk aggressive.
c. Career Question 3
In question thirteen, the situation depicted an 0-4 who is
deciding on alternative methods of getting a graduate education. Option
(A) would mean that the officer would go to a job in his specialty
keeping him in the "mainstream" and pursue a graduate degree on his own
time after normal duty hours. Option (B) means the officer will attend a
fully funded graduate program at a civilian institution. This would take
the officer out of the "mainstream" for the period of his education. The
assessment of risk in this situation is based on the assumption that the
expected outcome, a graduate degree, is equal in each case. However, the
officer who pursues the degree by attending the civilian school foregoes
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a year or more of military experience and may be less competitive than
officers who get their degrees on their own time. The design hypothesis
assessed alternative (A) as risk averse and alternative (B) as risk
aggressive.
d. Career Question 4
Question fourteen of the survey asks the respondent to envision
himself as a division staff officer responsible for originating correspond-
ence to the Department of the Army and other major headquarters. In that
position, he is asked which is more important: format, content, or whether
they are of equal importance. It was assumed that the officer who states
that the content is the most important is the more risk aggressive. As
supported during post survey interviews, this respondent envisions his
"message" as being most important, while other respondents believed that
their message will not be received unless the rules of the system are
followed. Paraphrasing one respondent's comments, "it is unfortunate but
oftentimes the content will not be accepted unless it is formated properly."
e. Career Question 5
Question fifteen, the last of the career questions, depicts a
situation where an 0-4 is working for an 0-6 who spends normal work hours
in casual conversations and then catches up on his work late in the evenings
or on weekends. The officer is once more faced with two alternatives. In
alternative (A) the risk aggressive officer gets his work done and leaves
on the normal work schedule. In alternative (B), the risk averse option,
the officer would spread out his workload to more closely match his boss's
schedule. The risk assessment is based on the assumption that the officer
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who works the longer hours with his boss believes he will incurr less
career risk than the officer who works at his own pace regardless of the
boss's norms.
C. SURVEY PRETESTS
Although this survey has some conceptual linkage to earlier risk
preference questionnaires such as Tversky & Kahneman's, the development of
the military situations depicted was unique. As a result, the survey was
pretested at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, prior
to administration. This pretest was administered to thirty Army Officers
from paygrade 0-3 to 0-5. Comments on situation reality as well as
identification of the risk aggressive alternative were solicited. The
pretest comments resulted in the alteration of several questions and the
changing of the format of some of the questions. In addition, the comments
as well as posttest interviews assisted in formulating the design alloca-
tion of whether an alternative was risk aggressive or risk averse.
D. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES
After the responses were received, they were sorted by rank to ease
compilation of data and determine if a reasonable distribution of
responses was included. In order to convert the survey responses to
nominal level data, it was necessary to recode each response. For example,
in the demographic section, marital status was recoded to nominal data by
converting married responses to 1 and single responses to 2. Similarly,
in the survey questions the responses were converted to nominal data by
assigning the value 1 to risk-averse replies and 2 to risk-aggressive
responses. Survey questions in which responses were omitted were assigned
a zero (0) as a missing value.

The compiled data were manually entered into a prepackaged computer
program (Statistical Package for Social Sciences - SPSS) for analysis.
[Ref. 28] This robust statistical program is widely accepted and used
for behavioral research. It affords the researcher a wide variety of
statistical evaluations which are easily obtained through routine manip-
ulation of the program. Another key feature of the SPSS program is the
convenience and quality of the output displays through a variety of graphs
and charts.
A number of analytical techniques were used to examine the interaction
and significance of the variables considered in the survey. These primarily
included, but were not limited to, frequency analysis, cross-sectional
analysis, comparison of the means and associated variances, and some non-
parametric correlation analysis. A chi-square and t-test were used to
establish if the results of the analysis were statistically significant.
The frequency analysis provides a general overview of how the sample
responded to the questionnaire and thus serves as a guide to which
variables appear to provide meaningful results.
Based on these results, a cross-sectional analysis is used to break
down the demographic variables into subsets considered relevant. These
subsets are compared against the survey questions to determine if signifi-
cant relationships exist. Analyzing the variable rank as an independent
variable provides insight into how each of the subgroups 0-1 to 0-6
answered each individual question. The primary focus is on the distribu-
tion of the responses to determine if any unique relationships exist.
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An analysis of the means and variances associated with each demo-
graphic variable in its subgroups is accomplished by using a breakdown
analysis. This analysis provides an easy method for comparing the relative
differences between the manner in which the demographic variables answered
the questions. For example, the mean response of 0-1 's to the combat
question can be compared to the mean response of the 0-6' s. Analysis of
the variances associated with these means is used to establish whether the
responses were tightly grouped together or varied between the risk averse
and risk aggressive response. Finally, a non-parametric correlation
analysis is utilized to determine if any of the demographic variables
considered significantly explain the variation in response to the decision
9
frame examined.
These analytical techniques coupled with the tests of statistical
significance are used to narrow the focus of the research to those




IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
The organizing method utilized to analyze the results of the survey
was governed by two needs or concerns. First, the underlying distribution
of the data was largely nominal and ordinal level data which restricted
the use of some of the more conventional statistical techniques such as
parametric measures of regression. Despite this limitation, the dichoto-
mous nature of the data allowed an assumption of interval level measures
such as means, if applied prudently. The second concern was to transfer
and package the data through the use of various statistical methods to a
meaningful level of understanding. This transformation primarily relied
9
on four statistical techniques with each transformation increasing the
confidence about any conclusions drawn from the survey responses.
Since each decision question was not going to be individually analyzed,
the responses were grouped into the four composite indexes of interest:
combat, finance, career, and the overall survey. In order to ensure that
these groupings were reasonable, a review of the relative rankings of the
means for each paygrade was conducted for each question and each composite
grouping. The review demonstrated the positions remained relatively
consistent throughout the questions of each composite group.
A frequencies analysis was done to discern the gross distribution of
the sample data throughout the variables. Based on these results, a cross-
tabs procedure was utilized to analyze how specific subgroups of the
variables responded to the decision groupings. Additionally, this procedure
provided a chi-square test of significance which assisted in the initial
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selection of variables that warranted further investigation. Using this
procedure as a guide, a second statistical test of significance was
applied by using either a T-test, or where appropriate, a Kendall's
correlation test of significance. Although these techniques constituted
the most important analytical procedures, a number of ancillary procedures
were also considered. These included additional investigations with the
students' T-test of the statistical significance of the difference between
the means, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), and some limited regres-
sion techniques.
The first method of displaying the returned survey data is the frequency
distributions tables generated by the SPSS program. These tables give a
basic understanding of the relative response rate for each of the demo-
graphic and survey questions and therefore provide the first insights into
the meaning of the data. The demographic data are examined first and this
is followed by the survey responses frequencies. In the survey where
individual responses were omitted, the totals do not equal the total
number of respondents to the survey and the frequencies do not total 100%.
A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS
The demographic frequencies are presented in the same order as in the
survey questionnaire. However, the sixteen original questions from the
survey have been reduced to the seven believed to be the most interesting
to examine and the remainder have been placed in Appendix B along with the
actual questionnaire response frequencies. The seven include rank,
education level, basic specialty, combat experience, expected number of
years of service at retirement, early promotion selection, and source of
54

commission. The demographics that have been moved to the appendix were
not considered central to the studies hypothesis, such as marital status,
but were included in the original study as possible alternative sources
for explanations of any variances or trends found in risk preference.
These demographics that do later provide explanations for some of the
variance or trends are discussed in the sections relating to the relevant
statistical analysis that was conducted.
1 . Rank of Respondent
TABLE II
Rank of Respondent/Frequency of Response
Army
Paygrade Respondents Population
0-1 ' 53 (17.8%) (10.8%)
0-2 58 (19.5%) (15.3%)
0-3 68 (22.9%) (37.1%)
0-4 59 (19.9%) (18.4%)
0-5 32 (10.8%) (12.6%)
0-6 27 ( 9.1%) ( 5.8%)
total 292 CHI-SQUARE= 38.541
significance= 0.000
The relative frequencies by rank for the Army population were
included for a comparison against the survey responses. The comparison of
these frequencies reveals a chi -square that is considered significant at
the 0.05 level. Thus, the sample is not strictly representative of the
overall Army rank distribution. 0-1's and 0-6's and above were overrepre-
sented. Despite these apparent differences, grouping these respondents
into the three categories of junior officers (0-1, 0-2, and 0-3), field
grade officers (0-4, and 0-5), and senior officers (0-6 and above),




2. Education Level of Respondent
TABLE III
Education Level of Respondent/Frequency of Response
Education Survey
2 yr college 7 ( 2.4%)
4 yr college 183 (61.6%)
advanced degree 106 (35. 7%)
The high proportion of advanced degree (36%) was not expected and
indicates either that a large percentage of the persons receiving the
questionnaire possessed advanced degrees, or that perhaps advanced degree
holders provided a higher response rate due to some empathy towards academic
research efforts. Due to the limited number of respondents with only a
2 year college degree, their responses will be excluded in any further
analysis that compares the levels of education.
3. Basic Specialty of Respondent
A broad cross-section of all of the officer basic specialties was
received, indicating that the sample may be generally representative of
the Army. Despite this broad representation, the specific frequencies of
response of some of the basic specialties was considered inadequate to
conduct meaningful analysis against. To accommodate the low response rate,
it was convenient to reclassify the basic specialties into the headings of
line, staff, and service support. The line category combines the responses
from infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, and the engineers; the staff
category combines the signal corps, military police, military intelligence,
ordinance, the chemical corps, aviation, and administration; and the














MILITARY POLICE 9 (3.0%)
FINANCE 9 (3.0%)
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 29 (9.8%)
CHAPLIN 2 (0.7%)




MEDICAL CORPS 7 (2.4%)
MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS 8 (2.7%)
















The responses in these combined categories indicate the largest
response population to be the line community.
4. Respondents with Combat Experience
It is interesting to note that a substantial proportion (39%) of
the respondents have had combat experience, thereby increasing the








5. Respondents Expected Length of Service at Retirement
TABLE VII




The retirement variable was grouped into officers who planned to
retire with less than or equal to 20 years of active duty service and those
who planned to retire with greater than 20 years of service. The 20 year
break point was selected because of the expected interest in the results
grouped in this manner, as well as the second category including all of
the officers planning to exceed the minimum career standard.
6. Early Promotion Selection
TABLE VIII




The percentage of respondents (12%) that have been selected for
early promotion appears to be reflective of the Army's current stated rate
of 10%.
7. Source of Commission
See Table IX. The category of "other" was primarily direct commis-









others 21 ( 7.1%)
B. FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES FOR EACH QUESTION
The survey questionnaire responses are accumulated by risk averse or
risk aggressive with the response frequency displayed next to each question
number. This display provides the reader with a convenient method of
comparing relative response rates to each of the questions in one place.
From the survey questionnaire frequencies table, it is interesting to
note that there are several questions where the response rate highly favors
either the averse or the aggressive response. In the combat questions for
example, the responses are fairly balanced with the exception of question
two which is heavily aggressive. In the financial questions, the responses
favor the averse response with the exception of question 9. In the career
decision frame, the responses to question 12 and 14 appear to contrast with
the generally aggressive response mode for the overall decision frame. A
sensitivity analysis was done to determine if these questions detract or
bias the analysis. The results of the sensitivity analysis are discussed
in each relevant decision frame. Across the entire survey, question
fifteen displayed the largest proportional difference in response prefer-





Survey Questionnaire/Frequency of Response
Question Averse Aggressive
cbtl 115 (38.7%) 180 (.60.6%)
cbt2 49 (16.4%) 247 1'83.2%)
cbt3 148 (49.8%) 148 <.49.8%)
cbt4 143 (48.1%) 151 ( 50.8%)
cbt5 167 (56.2%) 128 1[43.1%)
cbt 621 (42.1%) 854 1.57.9%)
fin6 253 (85.2%) 44 1;i4.8%)
fin7 225 (76.0%) 72 1[24.035)
fin8 246 (82.8%) 51 1;i7.2%)
fin9 83 (27.9%) 213 1[71.7%)
fin 10 217 (73.1%) 79 ;26.6%)
fin 1024 (69.0%) 459 1[31.0%
carll 94 (31.6%) 201 [67.7%)
carl2 231 (77.8%) 63 [21.2%)
carl3 86 (29.0%) 211 7i.o%)
carl4 195 (65.7%) 102 [34.3%)
carl 5 34 (11.4%) 257 1[87.9%)
car 640 (43.3%) 838 ,56.7%)
survey 2285 (51.5% 2151 (48.5%)
C. SIGNIFICANCE TESTS
Given the general trends and obvious findings evident from the
frequencies analysis, it was necessary to use more powerful statistical
techniques to understand how the demographic variables affected the
responses to the questionnaire. The initial step in this direction was to
use a combination of statistical significance tests to determine if the
data examined for results are meaningful.
Because of the underlying nature of the data (nominal, ordinal, and
some interval), three primary significance level tests were used. A chi-
square test of statistical significance was used to initially screen out
variables which would not provide meaningful results by analyzing the
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significance of the frequency distribution of the results. The Kendall's
nonparametric correlations test was used to augment the chi -square test
and was useful in identifying the demographic variables which most highly
correlated with the decision frame questions. It was recognized that this
test would be most meaningful for variables with three or greater number
of subgroups. The final test of the significance of the results was accom-
plished by using the students' T-test procedure for investigating the
difference between the noted effects.
In light of the basic research hypothesis, and given the general rather
than specific conclusions desired, an arbitrary level of significance of
0.20 was established as appropriate for the initial chi-square screening.
Since the nature of this research effort was exploratory and original,
rather than confirmatory, this liberal significance level was adopted to
include the initial consideration of as many variables as possible which
might impact on an officer's preference for risk. It was determined that
the more traditional, although arbitrary, level of 0.05 would have elimi-
nated variables which otherwise provided interesting results. Despite
this rather liberal level of significance, a second test of significance
using either a Kendall's correlation test of significance or a T-test, as
appropriate was applied to each variable considered. Any variable which
was not significant at the 0.10 level for these tests was not considered
in any further analysis.
Using these tests as a guide, a statistical significance matrix was
developed by comparing the demographic variables with the grouped responses
to the decision frames of combat, financial, and career, as well as the
variable survey which grouped all of the responses. The matrix shows that
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the variables rank, combat experience, early promotion, war college
selection, source of commission, education level, and planned years of
service at retirement were all significant in most of the relevant decision
frames. In addition, a number of other variables such as service experi-
ence, sex of respondent, and marital status were also significant in
several of the decision frames.
TABLE XI
Significance Levels of Statistical Tests




























































































































































































The primary methodology for analyzing the data involved a cross-
sectional analysis of the decision frame questions by the relevant demo-
graphic variables. This was accomplished by essentially relying on two
SPSS statistical procedures, CROSSTABS Analysis and BREAKDOWN Analysis.
The crosstabs analysis is the most appropriate for nominal and ordinal
level data. It allows an investigation of the sets of relationships among
two or more of the variables by computing a contingency table (crosstabula-
tion) of the frequency distribution of the cases by the variables consid-
ered. The display of the joint frequency distribution provides a greater
measure of how the variables interacted than a simple frequency analysis.
The breakdown procedure is used to investigate the central tendencies
of the variables measured. It provides a simple technique for examining
the means and variances of our primary criterion (decision frames) broken
down by the relevant demographic variables. This procedure relies on the
assumption that the dichotomous nature of our data makes it reasonable to
calculate the means as a useful measure of central tendency. The
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comparison of the means enables a gross consideration of the relative
level of risk aversion or aggressiveness exhibited by the subgroupings.
[Ref. 28]
The results are organized by examining the three decision frames as
discrete entities and summarizing the findings by the demographic variables
which provided meaningful results based on the tests for statistical
significance. In addition, in order to examine any general tendencies,
a composite variable labeled as "survey," representing the sum of all of
three decision frames was analyzed for significant results. If the theory
of response preference variations based on decision frames holds some
merit, combining these three decision frames into a single composite is
not necessarily logical. However, without experience or proof that the
composite of this questionnaire lacks credibility as an analytical approach,
this combination has been pursued as part of the overall effort to deter-
mine an officer's risk profile.
E. ANALYSIS OF COMBAT VARIABLE
The variable combat can be defined as the sum of the responses, using
the value 1 as averse and 2 as aggressive, of the 5 combat questions for
each of the respondents. Based on the variations displayed in the frequen-
cies section, in order to see if the 5 question decision frame was reason-
able, a sensitivity analysis was accomplished based on excluding combat
question 2. This analysis demonstrated that eliminating this question
from consideration marginally altered the chi-square significance levels
of the newly modified combat variable. For example, the chi-square
significance levels for the variable marital status changed from 0.057 to
0.063 and the chi-square for service experience improved marginally from
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0.065 to 0.058. Despite these small changes, using the acceptance levels
established for this research effort, no variables were added or deleted
when question 2 was removed from consideration. As further support of
the decision to not remove combat question 2 from the combat decision
frame, the sensitivity analysis of the means of the demographic subgroup
responses, showed the results would not be substantially altered. The
cross-sectional analysis of the variable combat, broken down by all the
demographic variables, shows that twelve variables provide statistically
significant results. The following findings are noted:
1 . Rank of Respondent/Combat
Crosstab analysis of the frequency distribution of the rank
variable in this decision frame showed that a large percentage of all
responses were grouped in the middle cells with the exception of the 0-6
and above subgroup which was decidedly shifted towards the risk aggressive
extreme. In general, the table shows that 0-1's answered more frequently
risk averse and 0-6 and above answered more risk aggressive than any of
the other ranks. This is supported by comparing the mean responses for
each paygrade provided by the breakdown procedure. The grand mean of
1.5774 for the combat variable was greater than the middle response of
1.5 demonstrating a slight preference for the more risk aggressive answers
Further analysis of the means demonstrated a general trend from 0-1 to 0-6
for increasing risk aggressive responses. The mean responses have been
added to the Crosstab table for ease of review. The chi-square test of
significance for the rank variable in this decision frame is 0.000 and the
































TOT PCT 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6
0* 2 1 1 1 5
40.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 1.7
3.9 1.7 0.0 1.8 0.0 3.7
0.7 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
1 9 6 10 7 6 38
23.7 15.8 26.3 18.4 15.8 0.0 13.0
17.6 10.3 14.9 12.3 18.8 0.0
3.1 2.1 3.4 2.4 2.1 0.0
2 10 19 18 12 7 4 70
14.3 27.1 25.7 17.1 10.0 5.7 24.0
19.6 32.8 26.9 21.1 21.9 14.8
3.4 6.5 6.2 4.1 2.4 1.4
3 20 10 20 20 7 3 80
25.0 12.5 25.0 25.0 8.8 3.8 27.4
39.2 17.2 29.9 35.1 21.9 11.1
6.8 3.4 6.8 6.8 2.4 1.0
4 8 18 14 14 10 6 70
11.4 25.7 20.0 20.0 14.3 8.6 24.0
15.7 31.0 20.9 24.6 31.3 22.2
2.7 6.2 4.8 4.8 3.4 2.1
5 2 4 5 3 2 13 29
6.9 13.8 17.2 10.3 6. 44.8 9.9
3.9 6.9 7.5 5.3 6.3 48.1




2. Sex of Respondent/Combat
The cross-sectional analysis of this decision frame broken down by
the variable sex shows that male officers answer more frequently risk
aggressive than female officers. This frequency distribution was supported
by breakdown analysis of the means. The standard deviation of the female
population for this decision frame was only 0.17 indicating a smaller




variance in their responses in comparison with the male responses which
had a standard deviation of 0.25. Since the sample did not include any
female officers above the rank of 0-4, a sensitivity analysis was done
eliminating the male officers above that rank. The results were consis-
tent, although not as dramatic as the initial findings. The chi-square
test of significance for this variable is 0.042 and the subsequent T-test
level of significance is 0.000.
TABLE XIII
Crosstabs Table of Respondents' Sex vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT MALE FEMALE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 271 21 292
TOTAL 92.8 7.2 100.0




The cross-sectional analysis of the marital status variable in the
combat decision frame showed that married officers selected the more risk
aggressive response more frequently than single officers. The breakdown
analysis of the means and associated variances supported this finding.
The chi -square test of significance for this variable is 0.065 and the
subsequent T-test level of significance is 0.030.
TABLE XIV
Crosstabs Table of Marital Status vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT MARRIED SINGLE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 207 82 289
TOTAL 71.6 28.4 100.0




The cross-sectional analysis of the combat questions broken down
by line, staff, and service support specialties shows a decreasing
tendency for the selection of the risk aggressive question. The line
officers 1 mean response of 1.60 was greater than the staff mean response
of 1.56, which was in turn greater than the service support response of
1.52. Although the chi-square level of significance was only 0.176, the
Kendall's level of significance was 0.064.
TABLE XV
Crosstabs Table of Grouped Basic Specialty vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT LINE STAFF SVCSPT ROW
COL PCT ON TOTAL
TOT PCT 1. 6. 8.
1 2 2 5
20.0 40.0 40.0 1.7
0.7 2.2 3.8
0.3 0.7 0.7
1 20 14 4 38
52.6 36.8 10.5 13.0
13.3 15.7 7.5
6.8 4.8 1.4
2 30 20 20 70
42.9 28.6 28.6 24.0
20.0 20.5 37.7
10.3 6.8 6.8
3 41 24 15 80
51.3 30.0 18.8 27.4
27.3 27.0 28.3
14.0 8.2 5.1
4 43 18 9 70
61.4 25.7 12.9 24.0
28.7 20.2 17.0
14.7 6.2 3.1
5 15 11 3 29
51.7 37.9 10.3 9.9
10.0 12.4 5.7
5.1 3.8 1.0
COLUMN 150 89 53 292
TOTAL 51.4 30.5 18.2 100.0




The cross-sectional analysis of this variable indicates that
respondents with combat experience tended to select the risk aggressive
alternative more frequently than officers who did not have combat experience,
This finding was again supported by the breakdown analysis. The chi-square
test of significance for this variable is 0.143 and the subsequent T-test
level of significance is 0.074.
TABLE XVI
Crosstabs Table of Combat Experience vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 115 177 292
TOTAL 39.4 60.6 100.0




The cross-sectional analysis of the level of service experience
demonstrated that officers with greater than ten years experience answered
the combat questions more frequently risk aggressive than officers with
less than ten years of service. The breakdown analysis provided another
perspective that supported this finding. The chi -square test of signifi-
cance for this variable is 0.065 and the subsequent T-test level of
significance is 0.030.
TABLE XVII
Crosstabs Table of Years of Service Experience vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT <C TEN YR y TEN YR ROW
COL PCT S S TOTAL

























COLUMN 149 142 291
TOTAL 51.2 48.8 100.0
MEAN 1.546 1.610 1.577
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7. Expected Years of Service at Retirement/Combat
A cross-sectional analysis of the combat decision frame with the
variable retirement showed that officers who planned to retire with
greater than 20 years of service answered more frequently risk aggressive
than officers who planned to retire with less than 20 years of service.
The chi-square test of significance for this variable is 0.013 and the
subsequent T-test level of significance is 0.130.
TABLE XVIII
Cross tabs Table of Retirement vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT <C 20 YRS >20 ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 165 116 281
TOTAL 58.7 41.3 100.0




The cross-sectional analysis showed a preference for the risk
aggressive response by respondents who had been selected for early promo-
tion compared to those who had not been selected for early promotion.
These results might be biased by the relatively low number of respondents
who had been selected for early promotion. Despite the limitation, the
chi-square test of significance for this variable is 0.043 and the subse-
quent T-test level of significance is 0.026.
TABLE XIX
Crosstabs Table of Early Promotion vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW

























COLUMN 36 255 291
TOTAL 12.4 87.6 100.0
MEAN 1.672 1.564 1.577
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9. Command and General Staff Co liege/ Combat
The cross-sectional analysis of the variable CGSC shows officers
who attended this school answered combat questions more frequently risk
aggressive than officers who had not been selected. Since CGSC and War
College are both service schools with highly competitive admission proce-
dures and since the results of these variables essentially replicate each
other, War College is not displayed as a separate variable. The chi-
square test of significance for CGSC is 0.002 and the subsequent T-test
level of significance is 0.004.
TABLE XX
Crosstabs Table of C&GSC vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 73 219 292
TOTAL 25.0 75.0 100.0
MEAN 1.655 1.552 1.577
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10. Expected Highest Rank/Combat
The cross-sectional analysis of the variable EHRNK (expected
highest rank) showed that officers who expected to attain the paygrade of
0-6 or above responded to the combat questions with the aggressive alter-
native more frequently than those who expected to only attain some lower
paygrade. The chi-square test of significance for this variable is 0.009
and the subsequent T-test level of significance is 0.005.
TABLE XXI
Table of Expected Highest Rank vs Combat
CBT
COUNT
ROW PCT LESS 0-6 AND ROW
COL PCT THAN 0-5 ABOVE TOTAL

























COLUMN 156 126 282
TOTAL 55.3 44.7 100.0
MEAN 1.542 1.627 1.580
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11. Source of Commission/Combat
The cross-sectional analysis of the combat questions by the
respondents' source of commission showed that Academy graduates answered
more frequently aggressive than any of the other commission sources. In
contrast, the direct commission officers were more frequently risk averse,
The means ranged from 1.51 for the direct commission source to 1.70 for
the Academy graduates. There is a general trend of increasing risk
aggressiveness from direct commission to OCS to ROTC to Academy. The chi-
square test of significance for this variable is 0.027 and the subsequent
T-test level of significance is 0.002.
TABLE XXII
Crosstabs Table of Source of Commission vs Combat
COUNT
ROW PCT ACADEMY ROTC OCS DIRECT ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT 1. 2. 3. 4.
3 1 1 5
0.0 60.0 20.0 20.0 1.7
0.0 1.8 1.8 4.8
0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3
1 2 27 8 1 38
5.3 71.1 21.1 2.6 13.0
4.0 16.3 14.5 4.8
0.7 9.2 2.7 0.3
2 10 37 15 8 70
14.3 52.9 21.4 11.4 24.0
20.0 22.3 27.3 38.1
3.4 12.7 5.1 2.7
3 11 48 14 7 80
13.8 60.0 17.5 8.8 27.4
22.0 28.9 25.5 33.3
3.8 16.4 4.8 2.4
4 15 36 15 4 70
21.4 51.4 21.4 5.7 24.0
30.0 21.7 27.3 19.0
5.1 12.3 5.1 1.4
5 12 15 2 29
41.4 51.7 6.9 0.0 9.9
24.0 9.0 3.6 0.0
4.1 5.1 0.7 0.0
COLUMN 50 166 55 21 292
TOTAL 17.1 56.8 18.8 7.2 100.0
MEAN 1.700 1.559 1.546 1.514 1.577
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F. ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL VARIABLE
A cross-sectional analysis of the composite variable Finance
against all of the demographic variables shows that eight variables
provide statistically significant results from the matrix table of the
significance tests. Similar to the sensitivity analysis done with the
combat questions, Finance question 9 was evaluated and it was determined
that the inclusion of this question did not significantly impact on the
overall results. For example, the chi-square test of significance goes
from 0.058 to 0.064 and rank improves from 0.054 to 0.022. The sensitivity
analysis did not add or eliminate any demographic variables from consid-
eration, thereby supporting the inclusion of the Finance question 9 in the
Finance decision frame. The following results are noted:
1 . Rank of Respondent/Finance
A cross-sectional analysis of the finance questions with the
variable rank indicated that 0-1 answered more risk averse on this dimen-
sion than the other paygrades. 0-6 and above paygrades answered these
questions more frequently in a risk aggressive manner than the other pay-
grades. The grand mean of 1.3 compared to the middle response of 1.5 for
the finance questions indicates the risk averse alternative was selected
more frequently than the risk aggressive alternative. An examination of
the comparative means for each paygrade shows that there was a general
trend for increasing risk aggressiveness across rank with the exception of
the 0-5 response mean which was between the 0-2 and 0-3 response means.
The standard deviations for this category ranged from a low of 0.17 for
the 0-1 paygrade to 0.28 for the 0-6 and above paygrade. The chi-square
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test of significance for the rank variable in this decision frame is 0.054
and the Kendall's correlation test of significance is 0.001.
TABLE XXIII
Crosstabs Tahle of Rank of Respondent vs Finance
ROW PCT ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6
9 8 7 8 5 2 39
23.1 20.5 17.9 20.5 12.8 5.1 13.2
17.0 14.0 10.3 13.6 15.6 7.4
3.0 2.7 2.4 2.7 1.7 0.7
1 26 31 27 20 13 8 125
20.8 24.8 21.6 16.0 10.4 6.4 42.2
49.1 54.4 39.7 33.9 40.6 29.6
8.8 10.5 9.1 6.8 4.4 2.7
2 14 12 22 15 9 7 79
17.7 15.2 27.8 19.0 11.4 8.9 26.7
26.4 21.1 32.4 25.4 28.1 25.9
4.7 4.1 7.4 5.1 3.0 2.4
3 4 4 10 14 4 5 41
9.8 9.8 24.4 34.1 9.8 12.2 13.9
7.5 7.0 14.7 23.7 12.5 18.5
1.4 1.4 3.4 4.7 1.4 1.7
4 1 2 2 1 3 9
0.0 11.1 22.2 22.2 11.1 33.3 3.0
0.0 1.8 2.9 3.4 3.1 11.1
0.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 1.0
5 1 2 3
0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.7 1.0
0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4
0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
COLUMN 53 57 68 59 32 27 296
TOTAL 17.9 19.3 23.0 19.9 10.8 9.1 100.0
MEAN 1.249 1.268 1.321 1.339 1.294 1.437 1.309
Education Level/Finance2.
The cross-sectional analysis of the distribution of the responses
to the finance questions broken down by the education level of the respon-
dents showed that officers with advanced degrees (masters, etc.) answered
these questions more frequently risk aggressive than officers who only had
a four year degree, although both groups in general answered conservatively
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The chi-square test of significance for the education level variable in
this decision frame is 0.048 and the Kendall's correlation test of
significance is 0.001.
TABLE XXIV
Crosstabs Table of Education Level vs Finance
FIN
COUNT
ROW PCT 2YR 4YR ADVANCED ROW
COL PCT COLLEGE COLLEGE DEGREE TOTAL
TOT PCT 2. 3. 4.
28 11 39
0.0 71.8 28.2 13.2
0.0 15.4 10.4
0.0 9.5 3.7
1 6 85 34 125
4.8 68.0 27.2 42.4
85.7 46.7 32.1
2.0 28.8 11.5
2 1 45 33 79
1.3 57.0 41.8 26.8
14.3 24.7 31.1
0.3 15.3 11.2
3 19 22 41




0.0 50.0 50.0 2.7
0.0 2.2 3.8
0.0 1.4 1.4
5 1 2 3
0.0 33.3 66.7 1.0
0.0 0.5 1.9
0.0 0.3 0.7
COLUMN 7 182 106 295
TOTAL 2.4 61.7 35.9 100.0
MEAN 1.229 1.278 1.362 1.307
3. Combat Experience/Finance
This cross-sectional analysis of the combat experience variable
shows that respondents that had combat experience answered the financial
questions more frequently aggressive than respondents without combat
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experience. Again both groups were relatively risk averse. The chi-square
test of significance for this variable is 0.150 and the subsequent T-test
level of significance is 0.033.
TABLE XXV
Crosstabs Table of Combat Experience vs Finance
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
FIN

























COLUMN 115 181 296
TOTAL 38.9 61.1 100.0
MEAN 1.343 1.287 1.308
Years of Service Experience/F-inance
The cross-sectional analysis of the finance variable with years
of service experience shows that officers with greater than ten years of
service experience more frequently selected the risk aggressive answer
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than officers with less than ten years of service experience. The chi-
square test of significance for this variable is 0.134 and the subsequent
T-test level of significance is 0.013.
TABLE XXVI
Crosstabs Table of Service Experience vs Finance
FIN
COUNT
ROW PCT < TEN YR > TEN YR ROW
COL PCT S S TOTAL

























COLUMN 151 144 295
TOTAL 51.2 48.8 100.0
MEAN 1.278 1.339 1.308
5. Age of Respondent/Finance
The cross-sectional analysis of the financial questions with the
age of the respondents shows that the older the respondent, the more often
he would select the risk aggressive response. The respondents that were
29 and below responded with a mean of 1.27, the 30-40 year olds' mean was
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1.33, and the respondents over 40 answered with a mean response of 1.36,
The chi-square test of significance for the age of respondent variable
in this decision frame is 0.162 and the Kendall's correlation test of
significance is 0.011.
TABLE XXVII
Crosstabs Table of Age vs Finance
FIN
COUNT ROW
ROW PCT 29 30-39 40 TOTAL
COL PCT
TOT PCT 1. 2. 3.
20 12 7 39
51.3 30.8 17.9 13.2
15.3 11.8 11.1
6.8 4.1 2.4
1 62 40 23 125
49.6 32.0 18.4 42.2
47.3 39.2 36.5
20.9 13.5 7.8
2 34 27 18 79
43.0 34.2 22.8 26.7
26.0 26.5 28.6
11.5 9.1 6.1
3 12 20 9 41
29.3 48.8 22.0 13.9
9.2 19.6 14.3
4.1 6.8 3.0
4 2 3 4 9
22.2 33.3 44.4 3.0
1.5 2.9 6.3
0.7 1.0 1.4
5 1 2 3
33.3 0.0 66.7 1.0
0.8 0.0 3.2
0.3 0.0 0.7
COLUMN 131 102 63 296
TOTAL 44.3 34.5 21.3 100.0
MEAN 1.273 1.325 1.356 1.310
Selection for Early Promotion/Finance
The cross-sectional analysis of the financial questions against
selection for early promotion shows that respondents who were selected
early for promotion selected the risk aggressive alternative more
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frequently than respondents that were not selected early for promotion.
Those officers who had been selected early for promotion also demonstrated
the least averse preference with a mean of 1.417 as compared with a sample
population mean of 1.309. The chi-square test of significance for this
variable is 0.005 and the subsequent T-test level of significance is
0.009.
TABLE XXVIII
Crosstabs Table of Early Promotion vs Finance
FIN
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 36 259 295
TOTAL 12.2 87.8 100.0
MEAN 1.417 1.294 1.309
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7. Command and General Staff College/Finance
The cross-sectional analysis of selection for C6SC with the
financial questions shows that officers who have been selected to attend
answer the aggressive alternative more frequently than officers who have
not been selected to attend the CGSC. The chi-square test of significance
for this variable is 0.049 and the subsequent T-test level of significance
is 0.011.
TABLE XXIX
Crosstabs Table of C&GSC vs Finance
FIN
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL

























COLUMN 73 223 296
TOTAL 24.7 75.3 100.0
MEAN 1.370 1.289 1.309
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G. ANALYSIS OF THE CAREER VARIABLE
The cross-sectional analysis of the career composite variable against
the demographic variables shows that only three variables have results
which approach the significance level established for this study. The
variables considered were rank, combat experience and source of commission.
The sensitivity analysis of this variable when eliminating questions 12
and 14 significantly enhanced the results by increasing the number of
variables which were acceptable under the established significance tests.
This justified a separate evaluation of the decision frame without these
two questions and the results of this evaluation are shown in subsection
4. An evaluation of all 5 questions in the career decision frame is
presented first in order to be consistent with the previous decision
frames and to contrast with the modified results.
1 . Rank of Respondent/Career
The cross-sectional analysis of the career variable broken down
by rank of respondent shows that the 0-6 and above paygrade answered more
frequently risk averse than any other paygrade. At the other extreme,
the 0-1 paygrade answered more frequently risk aggressive in the career
dimension than any other paygrade. While the 0-3, 0-4, and 0-5 paygrades
were very close in mean response, the 0-2 paygrade is notably higher,
although still below the 0-1 paygrade response mean. The grand mean for
the career variable was 1.57 indicating the overall responses to these
questions were more risk aggressive than the middle response of 1.5. The
chi -square test of significance for the rank variable in this decision

































TOT PCT 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6
1 1 1 3
33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 1.0
2.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
1 4 1 6 6 3 7 27
14.8 3.7 22.2 22.2 11.1 25.9 0.3
7.8 1.8 9.0 10.3 9.7 25.9
1.4 0.3 2.1 2.1 1.0 2.4
1 11 19 17 16 5 5 73
15.1 26.0 23.3 21.9 6.8 6.8 25.2
21.6 33.9 25.4 27.6 16.1 18.5
3.8 6.6 5.9 5.5 1.7 1.7
3 16 21 29 23 14 8 111
14.4 18.9 26.1 20.7 12.6 7.2 38.3
31.4 37.5 43.3 39.7 45.2 29.6
5.5 7.2 10.0 7.9 4.8 2.8
4 17 11 14 9 8 6 65
26.2 16.9 21.5 13.8 12.3 9.2 22.4
33.3 19i6 20.9 15.5 25.8 22.2
5.9 3.8 4.8 3.1 2.8 2.1
5 2 3 1 4 1 11
18.2 27.3 9.1 36.4 0.0 9.1 3.8
3.9 5.4 1.5 6.9 0.0 3.7





The cross-sectional analysis of the career questions by level of
combat experience indicates that officers with combat experience answered
in a risk averse manner more frequently than those without combat experi-
ence. The chi-square test of significance for this variable is 0.196 and




Crosstabs Table of Combat Experience vs Career
CAR
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL


























COLUMN 114 176 290
TOTAL 39.3 60.7 100.0
MEAN 1.546 1.579 1.566
Source of Commi ssion/Career
The cross-sectional analysis of the source of commission compared
against the career questions shows that OCS officers were the most averse
in their selection of responses while officers who received a direct com-
mission and those who were Academy graduates were the most aggressive.
The mean responses were 1.61 for Academy graduates, 1.56 for ROTC graduates,
1.53 for OCS graduates, and 1.61 for direct commissions. The chi -square
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test of significance for the source of commission variable in this decision
frame is 0.60 and the Kendall's correlation test of significance is 0.285.
TABLE XXXII
Crosstabs Table of Commission Source vs Career
COUNT
ROW PCT ACADEMY ROTC ocs DIRECT ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT 1. 2. 3. 4.
2 1 3
0.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 1.0
0.0 1.2 1.8 0.0
0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0
1 2 14 8 3 27
7.4 51.9 29.6 11.1 9.3
3.8 8.6 14.5 14.3
0.7 4.8 2.8 1.0
2 13 47 10 3 73
17.8 64.4 13.7 4.1 25.2
25.0 29.0 18.2 14.3
4.5 16.2 3.4 1.0
3 18 59 26 8 111
16.2 53.2 23.4 7.2 ' 38.3
34.6 36.4 47.3 38.1
6.2 20.3 9.0 2.8
4 19 33 9 4 65
29.2 50.8 13.8 6.2 22.4
36.5 20.4 16.4 19.0
6.6 11.4 3.1 1.4
5 7 1 3 11
0.0 63.6 9.1 27.3 3.8
0.0 4.3 1.8 14.3
0.0 2.4 0.3 1.0
COLUMN 52 162 55 21 290
TOTAL 17.9 55.9 19.0 7.2 100.0
MEAN 1.608 1.558 1.534 1.561 1.566
Modified Career Dec is ion Frame
As demonstrated in the sensitivity analysis, eliminating questions
12 and 14 from the career decision frame increased the number of variables
considered statistically acceptable for analysis. The significance levels
of the variables considered in the original grouping were improved and the
additional variables of CGSC, Retirement, Age, and Early Promotion are also
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significant. The variables of War College and Expected Highest Rank were
also significant but were excluded since War College is related to the
variable CGSC, and the latter variable was of relatively little interest.
The most pronounced change which results from the elimination of
these questions is that the mean response for the new grouping is more
aggressive than the old grouping at 1.76 to 1.57. Although both means
are still more aggressive than the middle value of 1.5, the shift upward
could be expected since the two questions eliminated were the most risk
averse for the decision frame. The elimination of these questions resulted
in a career decision frame which consisted of three questions which were
more highly correlated with each other than the original five questions.
For the variable rank, the modified variable tends to group the
0-1 to 0-5 means tightly between 1.74 and 1.79 which makes any differences
imperceptible. However, the 0-6 and above mean response is significantly
lower and the difference more extreme than in the original grouping.
For the variable Combat Experience, the new grouping essentially
replicates the original results with those officers who had combat experi-
ence answering more frequently averse than officers without combat experi-
ence. However, using the modified grouping makes the difference between
their means more dramatic as the means change from 1.54 and 1.58 to 1.71
and 1.78 respectively.
For the variable Source of Commission, the modified grouping of the
career questions demonstrates that while the OCS officers remained the
most relatively risk averse group with a mean of 1.71, the academy group
instead of the direct commission group was the most risk aggressive with a
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mean response of 1.81. The direct commission and ROTC groups were lumped
together at 1 .75.
The variable CGSC was determined to be significant under the modi-
fied grouping but was not significant when all the career questions were
included in the analysis. The results show that those officers who had
been selected for attendance at the Command and General Staff College were
relatively more risk averse with a mean response of 1.67 than those officers
not selected with a mean response of 1.78. The chi-square significance
level for this variable was 0.012 and the T-Test significance level was
0.01.
The variable Age was determined to be statistically significant in
the modified career decision frame with a Chi -Square of 0.002 and a T-Test
of 0.08. Analysis of the basic results showed that officers who were
greater than 40 years old answered these questions more frequently risk
averse at 1.68 mean response than the younger officers. Those officers less
than 30 years old were relatively the most aggressive at 1.79, and the
30-39 year age group were in the middle at 1.76. This variable was not
significant under the original career frame grouping.
The variable Early Promotion was significant in this new grouping
with a Chi-Square of 0.005 and a T-Test significance level of 0.05. The
results indicate that those officers selected for early promotion were
relatively more risk averse with a mean of 1.64 than those officers not
selected with a mean response of 1.77. This variable was not significant
in the original grouping.
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H. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPOSITE SURVEY
The cross-sectional analysis of the variable survey created through
a composite of the responses of all of the survey questions in the three
decision frames, shows that seven variables pass the test of statistical
significance. When the survey is broken down by the relevant decision
frames, the sample population responded to the combat questions in the
most risk aggressive manner with a mean response of 1.577; the finance
questions in the most risk averse manner with a mean response of 1.309;
and the responses to the career questions were grouped inbetween, with a
slightly aggressive mean response of 1.566. The difference between these
means were compared by use of the T-test. This evaluation showed a signif-
icance level of 0.000 between combat and finance, 0.000 between finance
and career, and 0.546 between combat and career. Further evaluation of
the means of combat and career was accomplished by use of the Wilcoxon
and Sign tests. These tests demonstrated significance levels of 0.141 and
0.004 respectively. All other evaluations between the composite variable
means resulted in significance levels consistent with the T-tests. The
grand mean for the overall survey was 1.483 indicating that the most
frequent response was risk averse, although marginally so. It is apparent
that the overall tendency towards the risk averse answer was due to the
responses in the financial variable. A review of the variances associated
with these decision frames reveals that the sample population answered
career questions with the greatest amount of consistency (variance 0.0427)




Due to the large size of the crosstabs tables for this section, for
the convenience of the reader the tables have been moved to the end of




The cross-sectional analysis for the entire survey by the variable
rank shows that the 0-1 paygrade answered the questions more frequently
risk averse than any other paygrade. At the opposite extreme, the 0-6 and
above paygrade were the most frequently risk aggressive in their responses.
An analysis of the means shows that the range of the means goes from 1.45
to 1.58. There is a general trend upward between these values as the
officer increases in paygrade with the exception of the 0-5 paygrade which
falls between the 0-1 and 0-2 paygrade means. The chi -square test of
significance for the rank variable across the survey is 0.200 and the
Kendall's correlation test of significance is 0.004.
2. Sex of the Respondent/Survey
The cross-sectional analysis of the survey responses with the
variable sex shows that male officers answered the questions more
frequently risk aggressive than female officers. The chi-square test of
significance for this variable is 0.188 and the subsequent T-test level
of significance is 0.012.
3. Sasic Specialty/Survey
The cross-sectional analysis of the survey responses with the
variable Basic Specialty subgroups of line, staff, and service support,
shows that line officers answered more frequently aggressive than any
other group while service support officers were more frequently risk averse,
A comparison of the means shows that staff officer responses were inbetween
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these two extremes. The chi-square test of significance for the basic
specialty variable in this decision frame is 0.206 and the Kendall's
correlation test of significance is 0.020.
4. Age of Respondent/Survey
The cross-sectional analysis of the survey as compared with the
relative age of the respondents shows that those officers that were less
than 29 years old answered more frequently risk averse than any other age
group. Officers who were over 40 years old answered the questions the
most risk aggressively. Analysis of the difference between the means
shows that there is a trend for officers to answer more aggressively as
they increase in age. The chi-square test of significance for the age of
the respondent variable in this decision frame is 0.179 and the Kendall's
correlation test of significance is 0.046.
5. Selection for Early Promotion/Survey
The cross-sectional analysis of the survey responses broken down
by the variable Early Promotion shows that officers who had been selected
for early promotion answered the survey questions more frequently aggressive
than their counterparts. The chi-square test of significance for this
variable is 0.086 and the subsequent T-test level of significance is 0.028.
6. Selection for Command and General Staff College/Survey
The cross-sectional analysis of the survey responses broken down
by whether an officer has been selected to attend CGSC shows that those
officers who had been selected were more frequently aggressive in their
responses than officers who had not been selected to attend. The chi-square
test of significance for this variable is 0.181 and the subsequent T-test






Crosstabs Table of Rank vs Survey
RANK
COL PCT ROW
TOT PCT 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 TOTAL
3 2 2 1 1 6
33.3 0.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 16.7 2.1
4.1 0.0 3.0 1.8 0.0 3.7
0.7 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.3
4 4 4 2 3 3 16
25.0 25.0 12.5 18.8 18.8 0.0 5.6
8.2 7.1 3.0 5.3 9.7 0.0
1.4 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.0
5 7 8 9 3 2 1 30
23.3 26.7 30.0 10.0 6.7 3.3 10.5
14.3 14.3 13.6 5.3 6.5 3.7
2.4 2.8 3.1 1.0 0.7 0.3
6 9 14 14 11 8 4 60
15.0 23.3 23.3 18.3 13.3 6.7 21.0
18.4 25.0 21.2 19.3 25.8 14.8 •
3.1 4.9 4.9 3.8 2.8 1.4
7 11 6 10 14 7 3 51
21.6 11.8 19.6 27.5 13.7 5.9 17.8
22.4 10.7 15.2 24.6 22.6 11.1
3.8 2.1 "3.5 4.9 2.4 1.0
8 8 11 n 10 4 3 47
17.0 23.4 23.4 21.3 8.5 6.4 16.4
16.3 19.6 16.7 17.5 12.9 11.1
2.8 3.8 3.8 3.5 1.4 1.0
9 5 7 11 8 4 4 39
12.8 17.9 28.2 20.5 10.3 10.3 13.6
10.2 12.5 16.7 14.0 12.9 14.8
1.7 2.4 3.8 2.8 1.4 1.4
10 1 2 5 4 2 5 20
5.0 10.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 25.0 7.0
2.0 3.6 9.1 7.0 6.5 18.5
0.3 0.7 2.1 1.4 0.7 1.7
11 1 3 1 3 1 2 11
9.1 27.3 9.1 27.3 9.1 18.2 3.8
2.0 5.4 1.5 5.3 3.2 7.4
0.3 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.7
12 1 1 3 5
20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 1.7
2.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
13 1 1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
COLUMN 49 56 66 57 31 27 286
TOTAL 17.1 19.6 23.1 19.9 10.8 9.4 100





rosstabs Table of Respondents Sex vs Survey
COUNT
ROW PCT MALE FEMALE ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT 1. 2.














































COLUMN 268 18 286
TOTAL 93.7 6.3 100.0





Crosstabs Table of Basic Specialty vs Survey
COUNT






TOT PCT 1. 6. 8.
















7 26 15 10









32 11 4 47





10 10 7 3 20
7.0
























COLUMN 148 87 51 286
TOTAL 51.7 30.4 17.8 100.0





Crosstabs Table of Age vs Survey
COUNT
ROW PCT 29 30-39 40 ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT 1. 2. 3.
3 4 2 6
66.7 0.0 33.3 2.1
3.2 0.0 3.2
1.4 0.0 0.7
4 7 5 4 16
43.8 31.3 25.0 5.6
5.6 5.1 6.5
2.4 1.7 1.4
5 17 9 4 30
56.7 30.0 13.3 10.5
13.6 9.1 6.5
5.9 3.1 1.4
6 26 24 10 60
43.3 40.0 16.7 21.0
20.8 24.2 16.1
9.1 8.4 3.5
7 . 18 23 10 51
35.3 45.1 19.6 17.8
14.4 23.2 16.1
6.3 8.0 3.5
8 25 13 8 47
55.3 27.7 17.0 16.4
20.8 13.1 12.9
9.1 4.5 2.3
9 16 14 9 39
41.0 35.9 23.1 13.6
12.8 14.1 14.5
5.6 4.9 3.1
10 8 7 20
25.0 40.0 35.0 7.0
4.0 8.1 11.3
1.7 2.8 2.4
11 4 3 4 11
36.4 27.3 36.4 3.8
3.2 3.0 6.5
1.4 1.0 1.4
12 2 3 5









125 99 62 286
TOTAL 43.7 34.6 21 .7 100.6




rosstabs Table of Early Promotion vs Survey
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL













































COLUMN 36 249 285
TOTAL 12.6 87.4 100.0





Crosstabs Table of C&GSC vs Survey
COUNT
ROW PCT YES NO ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT 1. 2.












































COLUMN 72 214 286
TOTAL 25.2 74.8 100.0
MEAN 1.522 1.469 1.483
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I. SPEARMANS CROSS-CORRELATION TEST
A Spearmans correlation test was used to evaluate if any significant
correlations existed between the demographic variables. It seems logical
to assume that a number of these variables such as rank and age would be
highly correlated and therefore may indicate if some of the analysis is
redundant, or if these separate demographic variables can independently
assist in explaining any observed variances. Using a Spearmans correla-
tion coefficient of 0.75 as a subjective criterion for a significant
correlation between the variables, only 6 out of 199 correlations examined
were relevant. These six are provided in the following table:
TABLE XXXIX





















V. CONCLUSIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the concluding remarks on
the basis of our analysis discussed above. Qualifications, and recom-
mendations for further research are briefly discussed.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the interaction of the demographic variables with the
decision questions generated a number of interesting findings. While
these findings necessarily represent a synthesis and correlation of the
relatively large body of survey results, the primary focus was to glean
some inferences about the data which could be understood and applied in
the military environment.
Specifically, the analysis of these results provided some meaningful
insight concerning the central research question of whether military
officers demonstrate consistent preference for risk in the decisions they
make. In addition, a number of tertiary but important conclusions were
reached which both supported and contradicted several of the major
research hypotheses. Finally, based on these results, some logical but
qualified conclusions were reached which could be extrapolated for compari
son with other research efforts. These conclusions, and the implications
of them, are provided as follows:
1 . Decision Frame Preference Shift
A general review of the overall results, considered in the macro




First, it can be supported from the data that military officers
alter or shift their preference for risk based on the decision frame they
are confronted with. This phenomenon is most graphically apparent from
an analysis of the sample population mean responses to the grouped
decision frames. The officers answered these questions significantly
different in each case. For example, the officers were relatively more
risk aggressive in the combat decision frame than either of the other
decision frames. Likewise, the officers were decidedly more risk averse
in responding to the financial questions than either of the other decision
frames. These noted differences were found to be statistically significant
and therefore support the conclusion that the context or framing of the
questions was a determinant variable in what preference for risk an officer
demonstrated.
The implications of this research for the military in general and
the Army in particular seem fruitful. The military is in many aspects a
unique profession in terms of the expectations and demands it places on
its officers. The variety and scope of the decisions a military officer
is confronted with may demand unequal quotients of precision, resourceful-
ness, timeliness and conviction. Given these demands, it is essential that
the military officer be flexible and adapt readily to the needs of the
system. What this research demonstrates is a profile of an Army officer
who recognizes the constraints which different decision frames pose and is
flexible in the type of decisions made.
It was also evident that despite the shift in preference between
the three decision frames, that the officers were relatively consistent
within each specific frame. When the sample population was broken down by
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various subgroupings such as rank, the manner in which these subgroups
responded was essentially stable. The O-Ts and 0-6's were always the
contrasting extremes for each decision frame and the remaining paygrades
were usually sequential in the same relative order. This level of con-
sistency within the subgroupings was supportive of the conclusion that
while the population varied in its overall preference for risk according
to the framing of the question, this variance was systematic and consistent
rather than random.
The general results indicated that military officers are not
consistently risk aggressive or averse throughout the realm of possible
decisions. The interpretation of combat or line officers as being risk
aggressive in all decisions is not supported. There is instead evidence
that military officers alter their preference for risk based on the nature
of the specific decision confronting them. Once the nature of the decision
is isolated, it appears that the subgroupings of the military officers are
consistent in their preference for risk.
2. Rank Relation to Combat Risk Preference
The hypothesis that the 0-1 paygrade would typically respond more
risk averse than the 0-6 paygrade in the combat decision frame was supported
by the survey response data. It seems logical to believe that the relative
inexperience of the junior officers causes them to feel a greater degree of
uncertainty, resulting in more risk averse responses than more senior
officers, who necessarily have greater overall experience. Supporting the
belief that experience was an important factor in the response preference
for the combat decision frame were the results of the variables measuring
combat experience and service experience. If a respondent had combat
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experience, or if he had more than 10 years of service experience, he
tended to respond to the combat questions more aggressively than if he did
not have those attributes. Assuming the senior officers represent the
successful "norm" for what the Army expects, the implication is that
despite the ostensible combat training and simulated combat exercises
junior officers are exposed to, they are relatively unwilling to exercise
the same level of risk aggressiveness adopted by the more senior and
experienced officers. What this may imply is that the nature of the
current combat training is inadequate in terms of preparing junior officers
to cope with the inherent risks associated with combat decisions. This is
borne out by the comments attached to the returned questionnaires. Junior
officers tended to want greater detail and clarification of the specifics
surrounding the question than senior officers. The junior officers
apparently wanted to reduce the uncertainty to the point where the risks
were minimal. It may be assumed that this is reflective of the type of
training they receive which stresses rational decision making where the
outcomes and risks are clearly defined. On the other hand, perhaps this
is as it should be. The Army may instead want to gradually develop its
officers over time, expecting that experience rather than training will
teach them to take the more aggressive risks.
In comparing the combat responses with paygrade, the curvilinear
relationship expected inbetween these extreme response averages did not
prove to be as consistent or systematically progressive as expected. For
instance, a close look at the responses for the 0-4 and 0-5 paygrades shows
very little difference between the mean response for each group, while the
difference between the 0-5 and 0-6 paygrade is relatively more dramatic.
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However, both the chi -square and the Kendall analysis data demonstrate
significance levels which support the belief that the differences noted
between the sample populations across the paygrades in the combat decision
frame are not due to chance and that real differences exist.
3. Rank Relation to Finance Risk Preference
In the financial decision frame, the hypothesis that there would
be a decreasing trend in preference for the risk aggressive response as the
paygrade of the respondent increased was incorrect. Although with the
exception of the 0-5 paygrade there was a progression, it was opposite to
the hypothesis in that the 0-6 paygrade tended to answer more aggressively
than the 0-1 paygrade. Where it was believed that the relative inexperience
of the junior officer would tend to result in a greater exposure to the
risky choice, it was in fact the years of experience and education level
that seemed to increase the preference for risk aggressive response. In
the financial decision frame, the chi-square and Kendall analysis demon-
strate significance levels that support an increasing preference for risk
across paygrade. Also relevant to the financial decision frame is the fact
respondents that are financial officers by basic specialty responded more
aggressively in this decision frame. Any conclusion about response pref-
erences of finance officers must be qualified based on the fact that the
purposive sample responses were not received and there were only nine
respondents in this category and the fact that all the responses were
weighted towards a preference for the averse response.
It would seem as though the purported scrutiny of financial deci-
sions is feared the least by those who face these decisions routinely.
It is plausible that constant exposure to a hazard of fiscal
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irresponsibility relatively decreases ones sensitivity to it. Alternatively,
another explanation is that the financial officer's familiarity of financial
regulations allows him to operate more freely in an area where others are
more greatly concerned with the pitfalls.
4. Rank Relation to Career Risk Preference
Within the career decision frame, it was hypothesized that junior
officers would be typically risk aggressive while the middle grade officers
would be more risk averse. These differences were expected because of the
differing career needs, expectations and the relative perspective of these
groupings.
The general results support the conclusion that most of the hypo-
thesis is replicated in the data. Some consistent relationships exist
even though some divergences from the hypothesis are apparent.
It was expected that the career questions would generate a large
amount of variance within the sample population and this fact is supported
by the data. Within this particular decision frame the officers seemed to
be the most unsure of their responses. The officers were apparently more
sensitive to the particular career situation depicted in the questions and
tended to personalize their responses. This was borne out by the large
number of personal comments concerning these questions which the respond-
ents attached to the returned surveys. In addition, the sensitivity
analysis conducted on this decision frame showed that eliminating certain
questions altered the results thereby limiting the applicability of any
conclusions based on these results.
Despite these qualifications, it can be generally concluded that
the junior officers (0-1, 0-2) appear to be comparatively the most risk
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aggressive paygrades in their selection of career alternatives. They were
the most willing to aggressively risk their careers on the basis of
principle or personal reasons rather than institutional needs as posed by
the career questions. The results concerning the middle range officers
(0-3, 0-4, 0-5) also support the hypothesis that these officers tended to
be more risk averse than the junior officers when confronted with career
and administrative decisions. However, the results do not support the
hypothesis that senior officers (0-6 and above) revert to the risk aggres-
sive response in making career decisions. Instead, this group was rela-
tively more risk averse than any other group. Although a variety of
explanations for this phenomenon is probably available, a plausible and
intuitively appealing explanation is that the senior officers view their
position as having the most to lose careerwise. Rather than being secure
and accepting their relatively lofty career achievements, the senior
officers are apparently still concerned with protecting or possibly
improving their career gains. In contrast, the junior officers have
relatively little career gains to risk and can afford to be more risk
aggressive in the career decisions they face. They have little insight or
experience within the institution to identify what the career penalties
associated with the aggressive decisions could possibly be, and perhaps
their excesses are often tolerated as a form of learning experience. The
importance of experience as a moderating factor in the selection of the
respective levels of risk preference is supported by the analysis of the
variable service experience in this decision frame. This showed a high
degree of support for the conclusion that the amount of service experience
an officer had correlated with the rank variable.
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5. Risk Preference and Military Success
Although not specifically addressed as an explicit hypothesis, it
was felt that the results would provide some meaningful insight into the
impact of the military system on the preference for risk an officer
demonstrates. In essence, it was felt that the unique military environ-
ment with its own educational, promotional, and reward system might iden-
tify and encourage a specific type of risk preference within the officer
corps.
The results of the survey provide prima facia evidence to conclude
that the military system does in fact promote the officer who is risk
aggressive. This is based on the high degree of correlation which was
exhibited between all the measures of the successful officer included in
the survey. These specific measures such as selection for early promotion,
selection for Command and General Staff College, and 0-6 and above in pay-
grade, all demonstrate that the successful military officer was generally
more risk aggressive than the officers who had not yet achieved one of the
measures of success. Thus, it seems likely that within the military
environment the more risk aggressive officer is systematically character-
ized as potentially more successful when compared to his peers.
A comparison of the results of this survey with the results demon-
strated by Kogan and Wallach [Ref. 17] concerning the variable age are
especially meaningful. It was originally believed that the army population
could be considered merely a subpopulation of the overall general popula-
tion. Kogan and Wallach found that the general population tended to
become more risk averse as age increased. In contrast, within this
research effort a uniquely different result was demonstrated if one first
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assumes the questionnaire was representative of all of the decision frames
potentially facing an officer. Those officers who were less than thirty
years old were the most risk averse and those over forty years old were
the most risk aggressive in their responses. This leads to the conclusion
that the military environment may be the moderating variable which is
creating the difference between the findings. It seems plausible that the
military system that encourages and promotes the risk aggressive officer
will eventually weed out or change the less aggressive officer. The
cultural and professional practicalities of such a system would eliminate
the less aggressive officer either through peer pressure or through the
"up or out" selection process. In any event, the resulting military
environment is an officer corps which is predictably more risk aggressive
with increasing age.
Another significant implication for the Army is whether they are
producing the type of officer desired or are even aware of what this
officer represents. In a very basic sense the risk averter can be con-
sidered a "yes-man" who is more comfortable accepting and following rather
than creating, questioning, and leading. It seems therefore plausible
that the ideal officer profile the Army as an organization wants to
encourage and promote has a tendency toward seeking risk. This does not
imply that being risk aggressive means that this officer will be reckless,
foolhardy, and undaunted by even the most extreme odds. The distinction
is instead made on the issue of whether the officer is risk averse or not.
Officers seen as risk seekers may be viewed as imaginative, flexible in




The present findings indicate that the military system is either
consciously or unwittingly encouraging an officer of this genre. The
success criterion established by the military system may have systemati-
cally rooted out the risk averse officer by eliminating him through pro-
motion or cultural assimilation. The result is an organization that may
be viewed as dominated not by yes-men, but officers who are moderately
risk aggressive, especially in combat, but less so in finance and career.
They seemingly understand the nuances of situational demands as evidenced
by the decision frames and temper their aggressiveness accordingly.
6. Basic Specialty and Risk Preference
The results of the survey concerning the relationship of an offi-
cer's Basic Specialty and his preference for risk were of some interest
because of the common perception that line officers tend to be more risk
aggressive than staff officers. In general it can be concluded that this
perception was supported. The combat specialty officers were generally
more risk aggressive than the staff or service support specialties.
Based on this and the earlier conclusions reached about the profile of the
successful officer, it seems logical to conclude that not only are the
combat specialties more aggressive, but they should have a higher percent-
age of "successful" officers than the other specialties if no overruling
selection opportunities are established by higher authority.
7. Questionnaire Validation
There were two quick checks accomplished in order to support the
validity of the questionnaire against previous works. First in Slovic's
1966 study, it was demonstrated that boys tended to prefer the more
aggressive response over girls. While our study involved men and women,
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and correcting for the paygrade disparity, the fact that male respondents
tended to answer more aggressively than female respondents is at least
not contradictory to this earlier study and at best is supportive of
those findings. A second check was done by the relative scaling of
questions two and three in the combat decision frame. As explained in
the literature review, Tversky and Kahneman in 1979 discovered and dis-
cussed a theory called the scalar effect as part of the prospect theory
[Ref. 11]. The dramatic increase in the preference for the risk averse
answer as the magnitude of the effect was increased between combat ques-
tions two and three is in direct support of the scalar effect theory. In
a similar manner, comparing the results demonstrated between career ques-
tions 15 and 12 may indicate that a scalar effect occurred. While no
specific expected values are associated with the response alternatives,
in a general sense the career penalties associated with these questions
are dramatically different. Refusing to work late hours with your boss in
question 15 may pale in comparison with the imagined penalties associated
with being disloyal to or potentially embarrassing your boss in question
12. In any case, the results to these questions essentially replicate
the effects noted in the combat questions and Tversky and Kahneman'
s
studies. Analysis to determine if the officers were consistent between
both sets of scalar questions somewhat supports the conclusion that the
same officers who shifted their preference in the combat questions also
shifted their preference in the career questions. This quasi-validation




8. Education and Risk Preference
There is common interest in the military community relating to
conclusions that can be drawn relating to an officer's education. As
related to the findings in the results section, it is plausible that an
officer's source of commission could provide him with a greater or lesser
amount of experience within a decision frame. For instance, it is gener-
ally accepted that an officer who graduates from the Academy would have
more military training than other commission sources. Therefore, it would
be expected based on the varying experience levels of the relevant commis-
sion sources, that the greater the degree of military training, the more
aggressive the responses would be in the combat decision frame. This hypo-
thesis was supported by the results. It should also be noted that the
combat decision frame is the only one in which Academy graduates could be
significantly differentiated from the other commission sources.
For further evidence that experience may be a key variable in the
risk preference of an officer, the variable education level was analyzed.
Since a postgraduate education typically includes courses in financial
management, it would be expected, and was supported in the results, that
these respondents answered more aggressively than other respondents who had
not received a postgraduate education. This preference remained even after
sorting out the 0-1 and 0-2 responses from the sample. This deletion was
an attempt to reduce the influence of age on the results since it was
unlikely that the 0-1 and 0-2 respondents had received a postgraduate
education.
Additionally, officers with combat experience answered combat ques-
tions more aggressively and finance officers answered finance questions
112

more aggressively than the remaining sample population. Since in all of
these situations involving experience the respondents responded more
aggressively in (and only) in the area in which their greater experience
existed; experience is supported as a key determinant in an officer's
preference for risk.
B. QUALIFICATIONS
Although the conclusions provided are logical and consistent with the
data results reported, it is necessary to qualify the ability to general-
ize the results of these findings.
First, it is recognized that the sample did not prove to be statisti-
cally related to the distribution of the overall Army officer population
when comparing the distribution of the officers by rank because the survey
sample was essentially purposive. However, a general comparison of the
distribution of the sample by rank, sex, marital status and basic specialty
shows a reasonable degree of randomness and correlation with the overall
Army population. While it was assumed that the rotation practice of the
Army would eliminate or minimize any geographic bias resulting from the
sampling technique, it is also possible that assignments based on preference
may have an influence in this area.
Secondly, the validity of the instrument needs to be qualified. The
instrument was linked conceptually to several previous risk/decision ques-
tionnaires and the results have been shown to generally replicate other
research efforts along some common variables. In addition, the instrument
was pretested and modified to provide greater validity. Despite these
efforts, the uniqueness of the instrument in terms of military questions
and decision frames essentially relies on face validity for verification.
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The survey responses contained a number of critical comments on the lack
of variety of choices or inappropriate choices provided. Several officers
expressed a desire for more scenario detail or more data in order to reach
a decision.
Finally, the overall conclusions must be tempered with the realization
that a number of institutional as well as personal biases may be evident.
The particular selection of demographic variables to be considered neces-
sarily represents a personal bias towards which variables are important
to measure. On an even larger scale, the selection of which decision
alternative was risk aggressive or risk averse could sometimes be argued
to be a subjective preference on the part of the researchers, even though
these determinations were validated by the pretests. The determination
of the "successful officers" and the variables which would describe this
officer are largely reflective of the institutional bias of what this
officer does or has accomplished. It can be logically assumed that an 0-6
has positive OER's, has attended the Command and General Staff College as




Based on the results demonstrated and conclusions reached, a number of
reasonable recommendations seem appropriate. These recommendations are
generally a recognition of the limitations inherent in this research effort
as well as the opportunity to expand on and improve the research.
1. Since this research effort concentrated exclusively on the Army,
the generalizability of the results to all military officers is limited.
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Therefore, an extension of the study to either the Navy or Air Force would
not only improve the general izability of the results, but also tend to vali-
date the conclusions.
2. Although the inherent difficulties of a longitudinal study in the
military are recognized, such a study would isolate whether the military
system encourages risk aggressive behavior in its officers.
3. Lacking a longitudinal study, a significant effort should be made
to examine whether the military system is systematically "weeding out" the
risk averse officer. Important variables to be examined include the pro-
motion system, the educational system, and cultural or environmental
impacts.
4. An improvement in the randomness of the sample would provide more
general izable results and possibly increase the confidence in the
conclusions reached.
5. Given the volume of the data generated and the wide variety of
statistical techniques available, it is possible that an alternate approach
might expand on the results reached.
6. Although this instrument was tailored for use in a military environ-
ment, it is recognized that a similar research effort in the civilian
business community might prove fruitful in determining whether the results








From: CPT Douglas Hayden (USA) and LT James Thomas (USN)
To: Questionnaire Recipients
Subj : Explanation and Instructions for Decision Survey
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to request your assistance in a
research project being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. We are interested in evaluating differences in
the manner in which Army officers make decisions. The enclosed question-
naire is intended to explore the judgements of officers confronted with
a variety of simulated military situations. The research from this
survey will compare responses over a number of demographic aspects such
as rank, experience, and military specialty. One of the features of this
research effort will be to assess differences in decision making among
various categories of officers.
2. The questionnaire asks you to imagine you are in a number of military
organizational settings in which you may or may not have had direct
personal experience. There are no right or wrong answers. What is
important is that you respond to each question based on your own assess-
ment of the situation utilizing your own intuition and knowledge. The
numbers used for describing certain situations (i.e. company size, etc.)
may vary slightly from your personal experience, and there may be other
alternative courses of action you may prefer. However, for the purposes
of the study it is important that you imagine you are involved in the
setting as described and choose from the alternatives offered.
5. Since this survey is anonymous, your individual responses will remain
confidential. Only group data will be compared and analyzed for relevant
results.
4. Pretests have shown that entire questionnaire can be completed in
less than 20 minutes. Since the success of this project is totally depen-





















Rank: (0-1, 0-2, 0-3, etc.)
Male Female
Married Single
Education level completed: High School
4 yr College
Your basic specialty is:
2yr College
Advanced Degree
Have you ever served in a combat zone? Yes
Years of Active Duty Service:
No
How many years of service do you plan to have when you retire?
What is your age?
Have you ever been selected for early promotion? Yes No
Have you ever been selected for the Command and General Staff College?
Yes No
Have you ever been selected to attend any of the War Colleges?
Yes No
How would you characterize your OER scores compared to your peers?
Top Third Middle Third Lower Third
How would you characterize your actual performance compared to your
peers? Top Third Middle Third Lower Third
What is the highest rank you expect to attain?







1. Imagine you are an infantry Company Commander with an augmented
company of 300 men which is expecting an enemy attack likely to kill
100 of your men. Two alternative action plans have been developed.
Assume that the consequences of the two plans are:
Alternative A: If Plan (A) is adopted an additional 25 people out of
the expected 100 fatalities will be saved.
Alternative B: If Plan (B) is adopted there is a 1/4 probability that
all 100 of the expected fatalities will be saved and a
3/4 probability none of the 100 will be saved.
As Company Commander you would choose alternative
.
2. Your infantry company of 300 men has been tasked with achieving a
vital objective currently held by an inferior enemy force. The two
possible plans to achieve your mission have the following consequences:
Plan A: It has been determined that you would achieve your objective
but suffer losses of 5 men.
Plan 3: It has been determined that you would achieve your objective
but the losses could either be 10 men if detected early (50%
chance) , or no losses if undetected (50% chance)
.
As Company Commander you would choose plan
.
3. If intelligence had underestimated the strength of the enemy in the
scenario described above with the following revised estimates:
Plan A: 140 casualties
Plan B: 280 casualties (501 chance) , or no losses (50% chance)





4. Imagine you are a Division Commander with 9000 combat soldiers.
You have been ordered to develop an attack scenario and your staff has
recommended the following alternatives:
Alternative A: Attack using all existing resources with no reserves.
There is an estimated 90% chance of success. There will
be no losses if successful , but failure would result in
the loss of 6000 soldiers.
Alternative B: Attack commiting 6000 soldiers and holding 3000 in reserve.
This plan has an estimated 60% chance of success, but
failure would result in loss of 1500 soldiers.
As Division Commander you would choose alternative
.
5. Imagine you are a Company Commander with your augmented company of
300 soldiers pinned down by enemy fire 50 yeards from your position.
Faced with the following options:
Alternative A: A conventional attack which would result in 40 of your
men being killed while eliminating the enemy.
Alternative B. Calling in an air strike on essentially your own position
which would eliminate the enemy but also has a 40%
chance of killing 100 of your own men.
You would choose
6. You are the Division Budget Officer for a Fort Ord sized post
(10,000 soldiers) and you have developed a budget that you believe to
be credible as well as easy to defend. You face the following choice:
A: Forward that budget and justification intact when requesting funds.
B: Inflate the estimate in order to try to hedge against potential cuts




7. Imagine you are a new Transportation Officer responsible for 600
vehicles. You currently have 100 vehicles on your deadline and are
receiving "heat" about reducing this figure to 60 which has been the
established standard for your organization. You face the following choice:
A) : Purchase the parts through the supply system. This option should
get all of the needed parts within 4 months and repair of the
vehicles will take 1 month (5 months total)
.
B) : Cannabilize some of the down vehicles to fix others. This can
get 40 additional vehicles up in one month, however this alternative
is expected to result in a higher breakdown rate which will cost
more in the long run.
You would choose
.
8. Imagine you are in a management position responsible for executing
a $5 million budget. At year end you find that you have not been required
to use any part of your $250,000 contingency fund. You anticipate next
year's budget needs to be similar to this year's. You face the following
choices:
A): Turn the money back in. If the money is turned back in, next year's
budget plan will be reduced by 10% of the returned money by higher
authority ($25K reduction)
.
B) : Spend the money on a one time questionable expense. Due to the
nature of this one time expense, it has a 20% chance of being iden-
tified by the higher authority. If detected it would result in
your budget being reduced by $125,000 next year.
You would choose
9. Imagine you are the Financial Officer responsible for obligating a
$10 million budget. Policy guidelines recommend that you maintain a 6%
contingency fund against unforseen developments (requirements) . In the
past 5 years the unit has actually needed no more than 2 1/2% of the con-
tingency £und. The money not spent on contingencies remains in your
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control but due to timing problems it can never be spent efficiently.








10. As the Financial Officer of a division sized post, which expenditure
plan would be preferred:
A) : Obligate your budget at a consistent rate through the relevant period.
B) : Obligate the bulk of the budget early in the period and the remainder
consistent through the period.
C) : Restrict expenditures early and obligate the bulk of the budget
late in the period.
You would choose
.
11. Imagine your Assignment Officer has just discussed your next assign-
ment with you. He has offered you a choice of the following 3-year assign-
ments :
A) : An assignment which he categorizes as career enhancing "from a
professional standpoint". However, this assignment will require
maximum commitment and performance in order to excell. This assign-
ment would have a negative impact on your family due to your extended
work schedule and lack of local recreation opportunities.
B) : An assignment which is not as professionally demanding but one in
which you are confident you will do well. This assignment is very
appealing to your family due to the desirability of the area and




12. Imagine that you are an 0-3 and you were previously given an important
assignment by your boss (an 0-5) and you have given him your recommendations
Even though you have carried the discussion as far as you can with him, he
still disagrees with your conclusion. You still feel strongly about your
conclusion and he is about to make his recommendation up the chain with-
holding your data in his presentation. You face the following choice:
A) : Say nothing more - at this point you are assured of an outstanding
OER and probable promotion on the next board based on your work so far.
B) : Find a way to get the information around your boss . Since this could
place your boss in a potentially embarrassing situation, there is
a 50/50 chance that it will negatively impact on the tone of your OER.
You would choose
13. Imagine you are an 0-4 who desires to get a graduate education. Your
Assignment Officer has discussed the following options:
A) : An assignment in your specialty which will keep you in the "mainstream"
for career purposes. Your new boss is said to encourage his officers
to pursue a graduate education on their own time after hours.
B) : An assignment at a fully funded graduate education program at a
civilian institution. This assignment will take you out of the
"mainstream" as far as your career pattern is concerned, but will
ensure that you get a better education with less personal hardship.
You would choose
.
14. Imagine you are a division Staff Officer responsible for originating
correspondence to the Department of the Army and other major Headquarters.
Which is more important to you:
A) : Format
B) ; Content





15. You are in a job that can be accomplished in a normal work day.
Your boss (an 0-6) spends several hours a day in casual conversations and
likes to catch up on his work by staying late and also by working occa-
sionally on weekends. As an 0-4 faced with the following choices:
A) : Get your work done and leave based on the normal work schedule
.
B) : Spread your workload out to more closely match your boss's schedule.
You would choose
.










CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
MALE 1. 276 92.9






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
MARRIED 1. 210 70.7
SINGLE 2. 84 28.3
0. 3 1.0
TOTAL 297 100.0
YEARS OF SERVICE EXPERIENCE
RELATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
TEN YRS 1. 152 51.2







CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
29 1. 132 44.4
30-39 2. 102 34.3







CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
YES 1. 73 24.6





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
YES 1. 22 7.4
NO 2. 275 92.6
TOTAL 297 100.0
OER AS COMPARED TO PEERS
RELATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
TOP THIRD 1. 228 76.8
MIDDLE THIRD 2. 62 20.9




ACTUAL PERFORMANCE AS COMPARED TO PEERS
RELATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
TOP THIRD 1. 259 87.2
MIDDLE THIRD 2. 35 11.8






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
LESS THAN 0-5 1. 159 53.5








CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 115 38.7






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 49 16.5






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 148 49.8
AGGRESSIVE 2. 148 49.8





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 143 48.1






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 167 56.2








CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 253 85.2





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 225 75.8





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 246 82.8





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 83 27.9






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 217 73.1








CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 94 31.6






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 231 77.8






CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 86 29.0





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 195 65.7





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT)
AVERSE 1. 34 11.4
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